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INTRODUCTION 
Palgrave Macmillan is a highly respected international publisher of 
academic texts. But strangely, many of their books start with an apology. Open 
one of their recently published books and within the first pages you are likely 
to find the following statement: “While every care has been taken to trace and 
acknowledge copyright, the publishers tender their apologies for any accidental 
infringement where copyright has proved untraceable.”1 In theory, Palgrave 
should always obtain permission before printing copyrighted material, but in 
practice this is difficult. Frequently they wish to use some expressive material, 
but it is not clear who owns the rights or even if the work is protected by 
copyright at all. In these cases, they take “every care” to get the permission and 
avoid infringement but still sometimes accidents happen and they mistakenly 
print copyrighted material without authorization. Because copyright holds 
them responsible for these accidents regardless of how much they tried to 
prevent them, they offer this boilerplate apology up front. But this raises the 
question: Should they be legally responsible for all of these accidental 
infringements? The usual rule in tort law is you are only liable for accidents if 
you were negligent.2 Run someone over in your car and break their neck, spill 
toxic waste in a town center,3 or let your dog bite a neighbor, and you are only 
liable if you failed to take “reasonable care” to prevent the accident. So what’s 
so different about copyright accidents? 
Copyright accidents are a ubiquitous and largely ignored problem.4 In all 
areas of social life accidents are an enduring and ever-present feature. 
Frequently we engage in beneficial activities, which, as a byproduct, pose a 
risk of harm to others around us. Sometimes that risk materializes into a reality 
 
1 E.g., RALPH HALL, APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH: PLANNING, DESIGNING AND 
CONDUCTING REAL-WORLD RESEARCH, at iv (2008); DAVID KIRK ET AL., THE 
SOCIOCULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN MOVEMENT, at vii (1996); SOTIRIOS 
SARANTAKOS, SOCIAL RESEARCH, at xxiii (4th ed. 2013); see also PENNIE STOYLES & PETER 
PENTLAND, THE A TO Z OF INVENTIONS AND INVENTORS 2 (2006) (using similar language). 
Other publishers often adopt the same language. See, e.g., STEVEN A. FRIEZE, PERSONAL 
INSOLVENCY: LAW IN PRACTICE, at iv (2004) (using similar language); JOHN T. MUGAMBWA 
ET AL., COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS ORGANISATIONS LAW IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, at xi 
(2007) (using this language). 
2 See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 295-96 (1850); see also 2 DAN B. 
DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 437, at 842 (2011); JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN 
C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 265-66 (2010) (stating strict 
liability exists at “the margins of tort” and is applicable in “a few special situations”). 
3 Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). 
4 See, e.g., Stephen E. Margolis, Law and Economics of Copyright Remedies, in 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT 241, 246 (Richard Watt ed., 2014) (“One 
explanation for the punitive elements of copyright law is that copyright infringement is 
seldom accidental.”). 
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and others are injured, although we did not mean for that to happen.5 For 
example, driving is a beneficial activity that is on balance good for society. But 
every time an individual gets behind the wheel of a car, there is a risk that she 
may crash into someone else and thus cause harm. Copyright is no different. 
Creating and distributing original expression benefits everyone, but it often 
comes with risk of infringing upon another’s copyright and harming their 
economic interests. Consider for example the documentary filmmaker who 
finds an old photograph. She wishes to use the photograph in her new film, but 
the photograph has no copyright information on it.6 At this point, she is aware 
that using the photograph comes with a risk that it may infringe the copyright 
of another. If she goes ahead with the use, perhaps that risk will materialize 
and an aggrieved copyright owner will later appear. Alternatively, consider the 
computer programmer who incorporates into her program code that has been 
publicly licensed on open terms. Later it is discovered that the open-source 
code had become “tainted” with the copyrighted code of another and, by 
copying the open-source code, the programmer accidentally infringed the prior 
owner’s right.7 Or finally, think of a library that wishes to digitize a work in its 
collection but cannot tell whether it is still under copyright.8 In all of these 
cases we find someone who makes a socially beneficial use of an expressive 
work but creates a risk of infringement. The user does not intend to infringe 
copyright, but there is a probability that she might. As with all cases of 
accidental harm, the question for policy makers is: Who should bear the cost of 
the accident?9 Should it be the person who unintentionally caused it? Or should 
it be the victim? In copyright, should it be the user or the owner who bears the 
harm? 
 
5 STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1 (1987) (“[B]y ‘accidents’ I 
mean harmful outcomes that neither injurers nor victims wished to occur—although either 
might have affected the likelihood or severity of the outcomes.”). 
6 See, e.g., Int’l Documentary Ass’n & Film Indep., Comment Letter on the Matter of 
Orphan Works and Mass Digitization 38 (May 21, 2014), 
http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/Docket2012_12/International-Documentary-
Association%28IDA%29-Film-Independent%28FIND%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YNA-
23TY]; PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT 
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT 95 (2011) (stating that “including copyrighted material 
accidently or incidentally in a documentary scene” was “the most galling of the copyright 
problems” faced by documentary filmmakers). 
7 See generally First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, SCO Grp., Inc. v. 
Autozone, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-237-RCJ-(GWF) (D. Nev. Aug. 14, 2009), 2009 WL 4834467. 
8 See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
9 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 95-96 (1881) (stating the “general 
principle of our law is that losses from accident must lie where it falls” and this can only be 
changed where there are policy reasons for doing so). 
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Copyright law has so far responded to accidents through a rule of strict 
liability.10 It does not matter how much care you take to prevent the accidental 
infringement; if you end up transgressing upon copyright entitlements, you will 
be held liable. Why is this so? A common answer is that copyright is a form of 
property right and, because property rights are vindicated against violation 
regardless of fault, the same should hold true in copyright.11 But this is no 
answer at all. Copyright has no nature except the one Congress and the courts 
give it. Whether copyright infringement should require fault or not is a 
normative question. Answering it requires a serious normative analysis, not 
empty invocations about the nature of copyright. Other common justifications 
of copyright’s strict liability are hardly satisfying.12 Although strict liability has 
been a deeply seated dogma of copyright for over a century, it has not always 
been so. Prior to the late nineteenth century copyright did in fact incorporate 
fault elements.13 Not only was fault a precondition for liability in some 
instances, but also a number of safeguards—such as formalities and a narrow 
scope of the right—were in place to make accidental infringement a rare 
occasion.14 Paradoxically, these fault elements were phased out in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, just as fault was becoming a fundamental 
element in tort law generally.15 This happened in a context of a highly 
conceptualist property thought and under the influence of dominant treatise 
writers steeped in an understanding of copyright as an absolutist property 
 
10 See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931); Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963); De Acosta v. Brown, 
146 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1944). 
11 See, e.g., Gener-Villar v. Adcom Grp., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125 (D.P.R. 2007); 
Plymouth Music Co. v. Magnus Organ Corp., 456 F. Supp. 676, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); 4 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (2015); Kent 
Sinclair, Jr., Comment, Liability for Copyright Infringement—Handling Innocence in a 
Strict-Liability Context, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 940, 945 (1970) (“The concept of absolute 
liability . . . appears to have stemmed from the early view that no property was more 
emphatically a man’s own than his literary works, and that therefore they must be afforded 
legal protection to the same extent as his real or personal property.” (footnote omitted)). 
12 See Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 353-54 (2002); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, 
and Innocent Copyright Infringement, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 767, 775-84 (2011). 
13 See Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 12, at 359-62; R. Anthony Reese, Innocent 
Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 133-34 (2007). 
14 Reese, supra note 13, at 145, 135-75. 
15 On the rise of fault in tort, see 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 2, § 123 (describing the 
history from 1850 to present); GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 2, at 14-18; MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 97-101 (1977); Robert 
L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. 
REV. 925, 926 (1981). 
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right.16 These trends are hardly popular today, but the dogma they created 
remains.17 
It is time to revisit this entrenched dogma of copyright. This Article 
questions whether strict liability is the appropriate liability rule for copyright 
accidents and what its alternatives might be. By identifying copyright accidents 
as a unique category, it turns the spotlight to a group of cases possessing 
distinctive features that merit special theoretical and doctrinal treatment. This 
framing also highlights the structural similarity between copyright accidents 
and their much more famous cousins: accidents governed by the law of tort. 
Tort law has a series of well-developed theoretical and doctrinal tools for 
dealing with such accidents.18 In this Article we apply these tools, mutatis 
mutandis, to copyright accidents. We highlight the unique features of copyright 
accidents, evaluate which liability rule should apply to them, examine the 
doctrinal alternatives for applying the preferred liability rule, and demonstrate 
how appropriately modified copyright doctrine would work well in practice. 
The Article argues that copyright accidents should be governed by a 
negligence principle. Comparing the available liability rules in several 
dimensions, we find that negligence is the superior alternative. The primary 
advantage of negligence is providing both copyright owners and users optimal 
incentives to invest in precautionary measures to prevent the infringement. 
Consequently, as in most tort accidents, the negligence rule is the most 
efficient way to reduce the social cost of copyright accidents. Furthermore, 
shifting the normative lens from efficiency to a principle of equitable 
distribution of cultural risk, we find that a negligence rule would enable 
broader and more equal access to opportunities for cultural expression. Given 
these benefits, we propose that a negligence test should be embedded into the 
fair use doctrine. In cases of accidental infringement, a use that otherwise 
would be infringing should be fair if the defendant can show she took all 
reasonable precautions to prevent the infringement. Through examples we 
demonstrate precisely how this modified fair use doctrine would apply to 
alleviate several systemic problems in copyright policy. 
We undertake this inquiry in three parts. Part I introduces the concept of a 
copyright accident and explores the similarities between it and tort’s law of 
 
16 See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 11, at 945. On nineteenth century conceptualist property 
thought, see HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 31-62. On the influence of natural property rights 
theory on the copyright treatise writers, see Oren Bracha, The Statute of Anne: An American 
Mythology, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 877, 913-16 (2010). 
17 See Bracha, supra note 16, at 918 (“For the writers of those treatises, that paradigm 
was still linked to the grand theoretical and historical narrative of copyright as a property 
right. . . . But during the twentieth century, that narrative fell into disuse and was gradually 
cast aside—a crutch no longer necessary for supporting the ownership of intellectual works 
paradigm it helped to construct.”). 
18 See, e.g., MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: ESSENTIALS 49-80 (2008); SHAVELL, supra 
note 5. 
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accidents. Part II examines what is the liability rule most appropriate for 
copyright accidents. After comparing strict liability with several variants of 
negligence, it concludes that simple negligence is the optimal rule from 
perspectives of both efficiency and equitable distribution of risk. Part III 
analyzes how a negligence principle should be applied in copyright doctrine. 
Comparing several alternatives, it finds that the preferable option is to modify 
the existing fair use doctrine to incorporate negligence. The Part concludes by 
demonstrating how the modified fair use doctrine would apply to specific cases 
of copyright accidents. Each of the cases represents a more general policy 
difficulty in copyright law, and the discussion demonstrates how the 
negligence principle embodied in the proposed doctrine can alleviate these 
difficulties. The specific policy issues are those of orphan works, copyright 
triangles, and opt-out options. 
I. COPYRIGHT ACCIDENTS 
Should copyright have a fault element as a precondition for liability? Before 
answering this question, a few clarifications are in order. First, our usage of the 
term fault must be specified. Fault is a slippery concept with many possible 
meanings. A common broad understanding of fault in tort is as an element of 
blameworthiness necessary for liability in addition to engaging in a proscribed 
conduct and causing harm.19 Under this usage, strict liability torts require only 
that the defendant engaged in a proscribed conduct and, in some cases, that this 
conduct caused harm to the plaintiff.20 Under fault-based torts, by contrast, 
engaging in a proscribed conduct even if it causes harm is insufficient to give 
rise to liability. Such torts require an additional element: that the defendant’s 
conduct was blameworthy under some standard applied to the specific 
circumstances of the case.21 Under such a capacious definition of fault, 
copyright could be easily described as fault-based, as several commentators, 
including one of us, have argued.22 To establish copyright infringement, it is 
 
19 JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 212 (1st ed. 1992). 
20 PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 82 (2002); COLEMAN, supra note 
19, at 212. 
21 See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 19. 
22 See Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 305 (2015); Wendy J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 452 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); 
Steven Hetcher, The Fault Liability Standard in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE COMMON LAW, supra, at 431 [hereinafter Hetcher, Fault Liability Standard]; Steven 
Hetcher, The Immorality of Strict Liability in Copyright, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 
2 (2013) [hereinafter Hetcher, Immorality]; cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of 
Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 206 (2012) (discussing how the substantial-
similarity doctrine and legal element of copying ensure that plaintiffs must show more than 
mere copying as a factual matter). 
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insufficient to show that the defendant copied from a protected work or even 
that his copying harmed the copyright owner. Copyright infringement requires 
in addition that the defendant’s actions fail some evaluative standards applied 
to the circumstances of the case, the two most important ones of which are the 
fair use standard23 and the requirement that the copying constitutes substantial 
similarity.24 Copying, even harmful copying, is not infringement unless it rises 
to the level of substantial similarity and fails to be fair use. Given these 
additional elements, copyright, as it exists today, seems to fit the broad 
definition of a fault-based cause of action. 
We are concerned here, however, with a more specific meaning of the term 
fault. The fault standard we are focused on takes into account in its normative 
evaluation of the defendant’s action the fact that at the time of acting, the 
conduct involved only a probability—not a certainty—of engaging in a 
proscribed conduct or causing harm. In other words, we are interested in a fault 
standard that gives due weight to the factor of risk. We are interested in this 
specific brand of fault because our focus is on copyright accidents—situations 
that, by definition, involve only ex ante risk of a copyright injury.25 Existing 
copyright does not already include a fault standard in this more concrete sense. 
As a rule, under current law an infringing act is not treated differently just 
because ex ante the defendant’s conduct involved only a risk of infringement. 
Existing copyright doctrines could be adjusted to take account of 
considerations of risk, but as they are conventionally applied today they do 
not.26 
More specifically, our focus is on a negligence fault standard. Under a 
negligence standard the defendant’s conduct is evaluated for whether it lives 
up to an objectively defined criterion of reasonable conduct.27 This objective 
evaluation of the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is usually 
understood as comparing or balancing the costs and benefits of defendant’s 
actions.28 For the reasons just explained, our interest is in a negligence 
 
23 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
24 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[A]. 
25 See infra Sections I.A, I.B. 
26 Indeed, we argue below that one major way of implementing a negligence standard in 
copyright accident cases is incorporating the fault inquiry into the fair use analysis. See infra 
Section II.B. 
27 See PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT LAW 36 (1997); COLEMAN, supra note 19, at 
332. 
28 The most famous example of which can be found in United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 
1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972). We do not mean to imply that a nonconsequentialist theory 
of negligence is impossible. But even deontological scholars have noted that negligence is 
usually discussed in terms of balancing of competing effects. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, The 
Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 249 (1996) (“It should be a great puzzle to 
those who consider themselves deontologists that the concept of negligence is most often, 
 
  
1032 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1025 
 
standard that, in balancing these costs and benefits, gives due weight to the fact 
that at the time of her actions the defendant’s conduct entailed only a risk of 
harm. There are other fault standards in tort, such as intention or 
recklessness.29 Indeed, the peripheral areas of copyright law that involve 
explicitly articulated fault requirements include standards that seem closer to 
these other alternatives than to negligence. Criminal copyright liability requires 
willfulness30 and the range of statutory damages varies on the basis of the 
infringement being willful or innocent.31 We do not mean to rule out the 
desirability of applying such alternative fault standards in certain contexts of 
copyright infringement. Justifying a fault standard requires an articulation of a 
normative rationale for the standard and for its applicability to the case at 
point. We undertake this inquiry in regard to cases of copyright accidents 
where negligence seems the most appropriate standard. We leave the 
evaluation of other fault standards in other contexts for another day.32 
A. The Accident Law Paradigm 
Recall the example in the introduction of a computer programmer who 
unknowingly copies substantial parts of copyrighted code. Assume that under 
ordinary circumstances such copying should be deemed infringing. That is, 
assume that copyright in computer programs is generally justified, that what 
was copied was substantial enough to pass the infringement test applied by 
courts to computer programs33 and that the copying is not otherwise fair use.34 
Given these assumptions, if the programmer simply knowingly copied the 
code, aware of a high probability that the code is under copyright and that the 
 
and certainly most clearly, defined in the moral language common to consequentialists.”); 
see also George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1972) (associating the “paradigm of reasonableness” with the dominant instrumentalist and 
utilitarian philosophy in U.S. tort scholarship). 
29 The common distinction is between state of mind fault standards, which require the 
defendant to have a specific subjective attitude toward his harmful conduct, and standard of 
conduct fault, which requires that the defendant’s behavior fail an objective evaluative 
criterion, irrespective of his state of mind. Negligence is the prime example of the latter, 
while intention and recklessness are usually classified as members of the former group. See 
CANE, supra note 27, at 36. 
30 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012). 
31 See id. § 504(c)(2). 
32 Some commentators have argued for an intentional fault standard in copyright. See, 
e.g., Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 12, at 420-21; Lipton, supra note 12, at 801-08; see 
also Eva E. Subotnik, Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 935 (2014). 
33 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,     
707-09 (2d Cir. 1992) (considering the necessity and efficiency of particular programming 
instructions coding in their infringement analysis). 
34 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520-28 (9th Cir. 1992); see 
also Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602-08 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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owner is unlikely to permit the use, then it would be easy to agree that she had 
committed an infringement. 
However, our case is not an ordinary one. In our example the programmer 
was not aware that she was engaged in unauthorized copying of a copyrighted 
work. There are many ways in which one could copy unknowingly. In our 
example the defendant copied code that is “tainted” by the proprietary code of 
another. The copied code was made available to the public by A its creator 
under a general license allowing copying and use as long as certain minimal 
conditions are met. Incorporated into this code, however, were substantial parts 
of another copyrighted program written by B, who never agreed to this copying 
or to further copying by others. Our programmer thus did not only knowingly 
and permissibly copy A’s code, but also unknowingly and impermissibly 
copied B’s code. Existing copyright law treats such copying by derivation the 
same as any other copying, and therefore it seems that the original conclusion 
does not change—our programmer should still be deemed an infringer.35 But 
something has changed. Our example is different from a typical knowing 
infringement case because, from the point of view of the programmer, her 
actions created only a risk of infringement. To be sure, a reasonable person 
engaged in copying of publicly licensed code should know that there is some 
probability that the code is “contaminated” with proprietary unlicensed code. 
She should know, in other words, that her action creates a risk of infringement. 
As long as the probability of the occurrence of the infringement is not so high 
as to practically approach certainty, however, the programmer’s action only 
creates a risk. That it later turns out that the risk materialized and an unlicensed 
copying had occurred does not change the fact that ex ante, as far as the 
programmer knew or should have known, her action entailed only a risk. This 
is a paradigmatic case of a copyright accident. 
How should such copyright accidents be dealt with? Should the legal 
treatment of otherwise infringing activities be any different when ex ante the 
relevant action entails only a risk of infringement? One familiar response is 
that no special legal treatment of such cases is necessary because voluntary 
exchanges will adequately dispose of the problem of optimal risk allocation. 
According to this view, the role of copyright law (as of other property regimes) 
is to adequately allocate entitlements to copyright owners and ensure that the 
entitlements are clear and easily applicable as to facilitate transactions between 
 
35 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.08[A]; 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT § 9.68 (2015) (“[A] defendant who copied from a third party which itself copied 
from a plaintiff is liable . . . .”); see also, e.g., Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471 (2d 
Cir. 1995); Costello Publ’g Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Pye v. 
Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1978); De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 411 (2d 
Cir. 1944). 
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such owners and others.36 Those who wish to engage in activities within the 
owner’s exclusive rights can negotiate voluntary transactions with them. In 
principle, the same wisdom applies to activities that impose a risk of copyright 
infringement. Those who wish to engage in such risk-inducing activities can 
enter voluntary transactions with copyright owners in order to optimally 
allocate the risk they create. 
Recently, Avihay Dorfman and Assaf Jacob have eloquently explained why 
this response is inadequate in the context of copyright.37 The domain of 
copyright, they argue, is much closer to “accident law” than to the “paradigm 
of trespass.”38 This is so because in the domain of copyright, as in the former 
and unlike the latter, in many cases transaction costs of voluntary transactions 
between owners and others will be very high. As a result, simply creating clear 
entitlements that are infringed upon any voluntary transgression and relying on 
market transactions for their transfer as in the trespass context is not a viable 
option. Due to the high transaction costs, the market will not take care of it. 
Dorfman and Jacob trace the high transaction costs often associated with 
copyrighted works to what they call the circumstances of “intangible 
property.”39 These circumstances arise from a combination of the traits of 
expressive works and the underlying legal framework. 
There are four main features of expressive works that account for the high 
transaction costs associated with them.40 The first is elusive boundaries. It is 
often hard to ascertain whether and when the boundaries of an expressive work 
have been transgressed. Commentators often blame these elusive boundaries 
 
36 See, e.g., Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, Copyright as Tort, 12 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 59, 84-85 (2011) (describing situations in which the law seeks “to channel the 
parties into a market transaction”). Note that the view described in the text is not tantamount 
to saying that copyright entitlements should be absolute or unlimited. Copyright involves an 
optimal balance between the incentive benefit produced by exclusive rights and the 
inescapable access costs associated with such exclusive rights. One may concede that the 
scope of copyright’s exclusive rights must reflect this balance and yet argue that once this 
optimal scope is established accident situations should be dealt with by strict application of 
these rights aimed at facilitating private transactions.  
37 Id. at 84-86 (explaining why a “use the market” approach fails to remedy copyright 
accident “either because there is no market or because the costs of reaching an arm’s-length 
transaction are prohibitive”). 
38 Id. at 86. This formulation may imply that, in the context of tangible property or at 
least in the subset of cases covered by trespass today, the trespass approach is necessarily 
justified. This is not the position of Dorfman and Jacob and it is certainly not ours. We 
argue here that the accidents approach fits copyright while leaving open the possibility that 
it also fits various contexts of tangible property, including some that fall today within the 
trespass category.  
39 Id. 
40 See id. at 86-93. 
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on the law.41 A long list of features of copyright law—the denial of protection 
to factual and functional subject matter, the scènes à faire doctrine that allows 
the copying of stock expressive elements, the substantial similarity 
requirement as a precondition for infringement, and the distinction between 
protected expression and unprotected ideas to name but a few—often make the 
determination of whether the protected boundaries of a copyrighted work had 
been transgressed a complex and uncertain enterprise.42 Arguing for a fault 
standard in infringement on the basis of a reasonable mistake in applying the 
relevant law gives rise to a variety of thorny and complex questions. Here we 
prefer to avoid this minefield by bracketing the question of copyright accidents 
traceable to the uncertainties of applicable law. Even laying legal uncertainty 
aside, in a significant number of cases transgression upon the boundaries of 
copyrighted works remains hard and costly to ascertain. A classic illustration is 
our programmer example above. In cases such as this, it is difficult for the user 
to determine whether her planned use will involve any copying of protected 
expressive material, even before she considers whether that copying actually 
rises to the level of a legally prohibited transgression. 
A second feature that makes transacting over copyright entitlements costly 
is the often uncertain legal status of the work.43 Even when one knows that she 
is copying, it may be difficult to find out whether, as a factual matter, the 
copied work is under copyright protection. Consider the case of an artist who 
combines in her visual collage a found old black and white photograph that 
bears neither copyright notice nor any other meta-information. Is this 
photograph in the public domain or under copyright protection? Answering 
this question is likely to involve costly factual inquiries. These difficulties are 
exacerbated by the background rules of copyright including the very long 
copyright term and the fact that registration, affixing of notice, and recordation 
of assignments are all optional.44 
Then there is the fact that in many cases, even when one can assume that the 
boundaries of a copyrighted work are being transgressed, there may be a 
 
41 See, e.g., Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 12, at 381-84; Lipton, supra note 12, at 776; 
cf. Dorfman & Jacob, supra note 36, at 87-88.  
42 Dorfman & Jacob, supra note 36, at 88 (listing examples in which “the protected 
story, or to be more exact, the author’s rights in it, are not delineated in a very clear manner, 
the story’s spatial boundaries are missing, and there is no clear signal to the user about what 
is protected and what is not”).  
43 Id. at 88-90 (recognizing that “unlike tangible property, where . . . a general 
assumption of ownership over objects” is “prevalent and embedded in the system[,]” the 
same “general assumption of ownership over objects—in the area of copyrights . . . cannot 
hold”). 
44 See Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 12, at 384-85; Dorfman & Jacob, supra note 36, at 
88-89. 
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plausible doubt about whether the use at issue is permitted by the owner.45 
Many copyright owners are happy to allow various uses of their works. Take, 
for example, Google’s full digital reproduction of the text of books as a 
necessary step in making them digitally searchable by a search engine open to 
the public.46 Some copyright owners would object to such a use of their works, 
others would be agnostic, and many others for a variety of reasons would 
endorse such a use.47 Sometimes the owner’s attitude would be clear from the 
context or from meta-information attached to the work, but in many cases it 
would not. Copyright’s very weak filters fuel this difficulty. Because modern 
copyright extends to any work that shows minimal originality automatically 
upon fixation, a vast number of works are protected and there is much 
heterogeneity in the circumstances of the works, their owners, and the 
surrounding context.48 The result is that often the owner’s preference in regard 
to a particular use is neither obvious nor trivial to ascertain. 
Finally and relatedly, ascertaining the identity of the copyright owner—
which might be the key for uncovering other pertinent information—may often 
be costly.49 Copies of expressive works often circulate without clearly 
declaring their owners or how to find them. Again, this difficulty is 
exacerbated by copyright’s background rules, including its broad sweep, long 
duration, the complex rules of authorship and ownership, and the fact that 
registration, notice, and recordation of transfers are all voluntary.50 
All of these circumstances mean that in many cases the costs associated with 
transactions over entitlements will be high and even prohibitive. Although this 
proposition is not always true, it is true often enough to make a sweeping 
reliance on market transactions unattractive.51 In this respect copyright is 
 
45 Dorfman & Jacob, supra note 36, at 90-92 (calling this the “object sociability” 
circumstance of intangible property). 
46 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (2016). 
47 See Brief of Amici Curiae Academic Authors in Support of Defendant-Appellant and 
Reversal at 1, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-
3200-cv), 2012 WL 5902375 (expressing the position of academic authors who “want the 
Google Books project to continue to provide public access to snippets from our books and 
from those of other academic authors”); Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright on Its Head? The 
Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1834 
(2007). 
48 Dorfman & Jacob, supra note 36, at 88-89; Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing 
Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 515-16 (2004) (discussing the effects of “unconditional 
copyright”). 
49 Dorfman & Jacob, supra note 36, at 92-93. 
50 Bracha, supra note 47, at 1824-25. 
51 To be sure, this point is not entirely new to copyright lawyers. Wendy Gordon argues 
that one understanding of the fair use doctrine is as designed primarily to solve such 
situations. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
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similar to tort law, which typically deals with the allocation of risks between 
individuals in situations where transaction costs of private agreements are 
high.52 But concluding, as Dorfman and Jacob do, that in such a case the law 
should optimally allocate entitlements and risks between parties rather than 
count on voluntary transactions to do so53 is only the first step. This conclusion 
does not answer the next question precipitated by it, namely: How should the 
law allocate the risk between relevant parties? At this point, the relationship 
between copyright accidents and tort’s law of accidents acquires new 
significance. The law of accidents provides not just the basic conclusion that a 
legal standard is required, but also a well-developed, normative-analytical 
framework for deciding what this standard should be. Before turning to the 
application of this framework to the copyright context in the next Part, a more 
detailed elaboration of the common structure of traditional accidents and 
copyright accidents is required. 
B. An Anatomy of the Copyright Accident 
What then are the essential characteristics of a copyright accident? First and 
foremost, copyright accidents occur when, at the time of the decision to copy, 
the user is aware only of a probability of infringement rather than a certainty. 
To be sure, absolute certainties are rare. Even someone who makes a verbatim 
copy of an in-print copyrighted novel bearing a recent copyright notice for 
purposes of direct commercial competition might argue that there is some 
miniscule probability that the copyright owner would not mind and hence that 
an injury is not certain to follow. There is however a pragmatic line that 
divides cases where the probability of injury is high enough to be practically 
treated as a certainty from cases of substantial probability where ex ante the 
activity at issue poses only a risk of injury. 
Cases of ex ante risk are ubiquitous in copyright and they come in different 
forms. Consider the following examples. A musician is sued for allegedly 
basing the tune of his composition on another popular song. The court 
determines as a factual finding that the musician did not consciously copy, but 
that, given the popularity of the original song and degree of similarity, the most 
plausible inference is that the musician unconsciously derived his tune from 
 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). In this 
interpretation, fair use exists to allow participants to bypass the market when voluntary 
transactions would lead to sub-optimal welfare results. Id. at 1601. However, as we show 
later, the current fair use doctrine does not achieve this goal in accident cases because it fails 
to take into account the fact that ex ante there is only risk of infringement. See infra notes 
187-89 and accompanying text.  
52 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 325 (5th ed. 2008).  
53 Dorfman & Jacob, supra note 36, at 94. 
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the original song.54 A filmmaker obtains permission to combine in the 
soundtrack of his documentary about a 1970s underground singer several 
songs by said singer. After the documentary attains surprising success, a third 
party materializes and claims that the lyrics were actually largely copied by the 
singer from the third party’s unpublished poems and that as a result the 
documentary infringes his copyright.55 In her book manuscripts, a historian of 
design includes photographs from 1930s European magazines of items 
designed in art deco style. The photographs as they appeared in the magazine 
contained neither notice nor any meta-information. After publication, the 
historian’s publisher receives a letter from a person claiming to be the heir of 
the photographer and copyright owner of the photographs and demanding 
substantial compensation for any past and future use of the images. An 
architect produces architectural plans for a client’s house. The plans are 
derived from rough drafts provided by the client. The client plausibly explains 
that she made the drafts. After the structure is built, a third-party architect files 
suit against the firm claiming that the drafts were actually made by him in the 
course of previous dealings with the client. 
In all of these cases we have an injurer user and a victim copyright owner 
who suffers an injury. But in all of these cases ex ante—at the time of the 
relevant action from the point of view of the user—the action involved only a 
probability of injury to the copyright owner. The user knew or at least should 
have known that his actions entailed a risk of an injury. But, just as in other 
accidents, it was only a risk, not a certainty, of which she should have been 
aware. In copyright accidents ex ante uncertainty is traceable to the incomplete 
information available to the user.56 If the actors in each of the examples above 
had complete information about all relevant factors, including the work’s legal 
status, the fact of copying, and the identity and preference of the copyright 
owner, they would have certainty about the injury caused by their actions. The 
lack of such complete information is what makes the injury only a risk. 
Now consider how the risk of infringement alters the normative evaluation 
of a user’s conduct. From an efficiency perspective, copyright is a measure for 
ensuring optimal incentives for creation under conditions where creators’ 
inability to exclude copiers and the low cost of copying compared to creation 
are likely to significantly erode these incentives.57 Copyright always comes, 
however, with a price tag in the form of an inefficient restriction on access to 
existing works, both for purposes of consumption and for purposes of future 
 
54 See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976).  
55 The hypothetical is inspired by the different facts of Gomba Music, Inc. v. Avant, 62 F. 
Supp. 3d 632 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
56 Arguably this is ultimately true of all accidents.  
57 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 483, 485 (1996). 
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creation.58 Therefore efficiency’s touchstone for optimal copyright is the 
proper balance between copyright’s incentive benefits and access costs. More 
specifically, its creed is bestowing on the copyright owner only exclusive 
rights whose incentive benefit clearly outweighs their access cost.59 Returning 
to our context, assume that in each of the examples of copyright accidents 
above the injury is such that if done under conditions of ex ante certainty, it 
should be deemed infringing. This means that including this action within the 
scope of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner generates more incentive 
benefit than access cost. It does not follow from this assumption, however, that 
the same cost/benefit analysis conducted when there is only a risk of injury 
would lead to the same conclusion. Looking at the question ex ante from the 
point of view of the injurer, now his action involves only a risk of injury and 
therefore a discounted expected harm. Being able to exclude others from a 
certain injurious action is worth more to the copyright owner and therefore 
generates more incentive for creation than being able to exclude others from 
actions that generate mere risks of the same injury. The discounted expected 
harm of the injurer’s actions, under conditions of risk and the corresponding 
discounted incentive benefit of prohibiting it, open for reevaluation copyright’s 
basic cost/benefit calculus. 
At this point it should be easy to see that copyright accidents pose the 
dilemma famously described by Ronald Coase as standing at the heart of tort 
law.60 Coase argued that the question of social cost is not how to restrain A 
who inflicts harm on B. Because potentially tortious acts often involve 
legitimate and useful activities that harm or risk harming others, restricting 
such activities is itself harmful.61 Restraining a factory from operating because 
it inflicts harm on fishermen by polluting a stream inflicts harm on the factory 
by preventing (or raising the cost of) its manufacturing activity. The problem is 
one of “a reciprocal nature”: Should the law avoid the harm to B by inflicting 
harm on A, or vice versa?62 Copyright accidents (like accidents in general) are 
a private case of this dilemma. Injurers, such as the musician, the 
documentarian, the historian, and the architect in the examples above, are 
engaged in beneficial activities that impose a risk of harm on others. 
Restraining such activities to avoid their risk will impose harm on those who 
engage in them and on those who benefit from them. “The problem is to avoid 
the more serious harm.”63 The feature that distinguishes accident cases is that, 
having decided that certain activities are worth restraining when injurious 
 
58 Id. 
59 William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1659, 1703-04 (1988). 
60 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
61 Id. at 2 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
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effects are certain to follow from them, it does not follow that the same 
activities are worth restraining when they entail only a risk of similar injurious 
effects. An action that entails a ten percent risk of copying someone’s work 
should be evaluated differently than an action that is certain to do so, just as 
taking a drive that entails a ten percent risk of hitting somebody is evaluated 
differently than taking the same drive when it is known for certain that 
someone will be hit. 
 The last general lesson from the realm of accident law, whose applicability 
becomes apparent once we reconceive the copyright accident as such, is the 
concept of cost-effective prevention. Accident law, the maxim is often 
repeated, is not about perfect prevention of harmful activities. The logic 
underlying this law is rather that of cost-effective prevention.64 The law is 
shaped with the purpose of giving those actors who are best situated to prevent 
accidents incentives to invest optimally in their prevention; that is, to invest up 
to the point where the marginal benefit of prevention equals the marginal cost 
of the precautions. To put it bluntly, as Guido Calabresi did, we consciously 
tolerate a certain level of accidents because of our prediction that the cost of 
eliminating them will be much greater than the benefit.65 The same applies to 
the law of copyright accidents. In each of the examples above the copyright 
injurers could have avoided the injury to the victim. They could have taken 
precautions, usually in the form of investment in uncovering the lacking 
information about the fact of copying, the work’s status, or the copyright 
owner’s identity and preference. Alternatively the injurer could have forgone 
his action altogether, thereby eliminating the risk associated with it. Each of 
these preventive measures, including forgoing the risk-inducing action, has a 
cost. As with accident law in general, the purpose of copyright accident law 
should not be the elimination of copyright accidents. Nor should it have a 
unitary focus on the user and the preventive measures available to him. The 
goal of copyright accident law should be giving all relevant actors optimal or 
cost-justified incentives for the prevention of accidents. Among other things, it 
is likely that the result of such a criterion will be tolerating ex post a certain 
amount of injurious activities that under non-accident circumstances are 
deemed infringing. 
Armed with these basic insights from the realm of accident law—about risk, 
the optimal allocation of social cost, and optimal preventive incentives—we 
proceed to examine in detail the appropriate legal treatment of copyright 
accidents. 
II. SHOULD COPYRIGHT HAVE A NEGLIGENCE REQUIREMENT? 
Whether copyright accidents should be governed by a negligence standard is 
a normative question. Answering it requires a normative framework. The bulk 
 
64 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 17-24 (1970).  
65 Id. at 17-18. 
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of our analysis adopts economic efficiency as its normative guiding light. At 
the end of this Part, however, we switch our normative lens from efficiency to 
several competing normative frameworks that share a family resemblance: 
self-determination, cultural democracy, and human flourishing. The analysis 
reveals that copyright accidents should be governed by a negligence rule. After 
comparing strict liability with several variants of negligence, we find that a 
simple negligence rule is optimal from both efficiency and equitable 
distribution of risk perspectives. 
A. A Unilateral Model 
Starting with brutally simplified assumptions, postulate that copyright 
accidents always involve a unilateral model and that the only available legal 
rules are strict liability and negligence. A unilateral model means that only one 
party—in this case, the injurer—can take effective precautions against the 
harm. As a result, the only relevant question is which legal rule will incentivize 
the injurer to invest optimally in accident prevention. 
Under a strict liability rule, an injurer is liable whenever he engaged in a 
proscribed activity that caused damage to the victim.66 The strict liability rule 
requires neither the balancing of the parties’ interests nor consideration of 
whether ex ante the injurer’s actions entailed only a risk. The translation of 
strict liability into copyright doctrine is straightforward. Under this rule a 
defendant would be liable whenever his action falls within the exclusive right 
of the copyright owner and is not shielded by one of copyright’s exemptions or 
defenses.67 That the infringement was an accident has no relevance under this 
rule. 
By contrast, establishing liability under a negligence rule requires more than 
showing that the injurer engaged in a proscribed conduct that caused harm. 
Here liability also requires that the injurer’s conduct fail a case-specific 
normative evaluation often referred to as the reasonable person standard.68 
Within the efficiency framework it is universally accepted that the criterion for 
evaluating the injurer’s conduct under the reasonable person standard is 
comparing the costs and benefits of the preventive measures available to him 
 
66 GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 2, at 90. 
67 As explained above, existing copyright doctrine has an extra wrinkle that complicates 
the traditional distinction between strict liability and negligence. Arguably, because 
copyright infringement is subject to case-specific balancing formulas embodied in the fair 
use doctrine and the improper appropriation requirement, it does not conform neatly to the 
definition of strict liability. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. It is clear, however, 
that existing copyright does not subject infringement to a negligence standard because its 
balancing mechanisms do not take into account circumstances where ex ante there is a mere 
risk of infringement. Therefore, existing copyright may be described as a hybrid standard, 
located in between the ideal models of strict liability and negligence.      
68 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 2, § 127. 
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ex ante at the time of his conduct.69 The injurer is liable only if he failed to 
take a cost-justified preventive measure. This criterion is operationalized 
through the famous Learned Hand formula commonly formalized as: B<PL.70 
In this formula B represents the marginal cost (“the burden”) to the injurer of 
taking a certain precaution, L represents the marginal loss to the victim that 
would be avoided by that precaution, and P represents the probability of that 
loss occurring. Under the Hand formula an injurer is negligent, and therefore 
liable, only when she failed to take a precaution whose marginal benefit in 
reducing the expectancy of harm outweighs its marginal cost.71 
Translating the negligence standard into copyright terms requires some 
explication. As in the general Hand formula, the negligence calculus must be 
applied ex ante, meaning, at the time at which the injurer undertook the 
relevant conduct. The burden on the injurer would be the cost of a relevant 
preventive measure, such as trying to ascertain a work’s legal status, detect 
unknown copying, or uncover the identity of a copyright owner and 
discovering her preference. To the extent there is a claim that a possible 
preventive measure was forgoing the injurer’s activity altogether, the cost of 
that measure would be the opportunity cost of such forbearance. On the other 
side of the formula the marginal loss avoided must be discounted by the 
probability, at the time of the conduct, of the injury occurring. The tricky 
question is: What is the loss that should be avoided? In terms of copyright 
policy, this is not the ex post private damage suffered by the copyright owner, 
such as lost sales or forgone licensing fees. The real loss is the negative 
incentive effect on creation that such private loss might have. In other words, 
what matters in terms of public policy is the extent to which (if any) the private 
loss suffered by the copyright owner (at t1) might reduce the incentive to 
create by those who anticipate such potential injury (at the later time of t2).72 
For simplicity of analysis, we will assume that the owner’s private loss (at t1) 
is a suitable proxy for the lost incentive to create (at t2). Thus, a negligence 
standard in copyright would compare the cost of the user’s precautions against 
the expected private harm to the owner. 
In a unilateral model, a strict liability and a negligence rule would create 
equally optimal preventive incentives to the injurer and as a result strict 
 
69 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
63-64 (1987). 
70 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see COOTER & 
ULEN, supra note 50, at 349-51; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 69, at 85. 
71 See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. 
72 But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. 
L. REV. 975, 1014 (2002) (highlighting the danger of relying on the owner’s private harm as 
a proxy for public harm). More accurately, the inquiry is about the total value of works not 
created because their potential creators anticipate at the time of creation the private damage 
that will be caused by an action equivalent to that of the defendant.  
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liability is preferable.73 Under a negligence rule the injurer would invest only 
in cost-effective precautions. If a precaution is cost-effective, the injurer is 
required to take it to avoid liability, and he will take it because (assuming full 
compensatory damages) the expected amount of damages is greater than the 
cost of the measure.74 If a precaution is not cost effective, the injurer is free 
from the risk of liability and he has no incentive to take it. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, a strict liability rule will lead to the same results.75 Under a strict 
liability rule the injurer is liable for any damage caused by him. But this does 
not mean that the injurer has an incentive to take any prevention measure. 
Expecting to internalize the damage, the injurer would only take measures 
whose cost is smaller than their marginal effect on the expected loss.76 From 
his perspective, better to incur a risk of liability than invest in a preventive 
measure whose benefit in reducing the expected harm is outweighed by its 
cost. 
If both rules are expected to yield identical preventive outcomes, why is 
strict liability preferable? Because the different rules have other effects that 
make strict liability superior. The two most prominent ones are administrative 
cost and error cost. Administrative cost is the cost of resolving disputes 
incurred by both the parties and any institution involved, such as a court.77 
Error cost is the cost produced by suboptimal incentives created by a legal 
standard whose content and application inaccurately track the underlying 
policy.78 It is commonly assumed that because negligence requires a complex 
determination based on much more contextual information, strict liability 
involves significantly lower administrative and error costs.79 As we argue 
below, these assumptions are overstated.80 Nevertheless, it is plausible that 
negligence is a more costly legal standard overall. Therefore, if, as the 
unilateral model shows, strict liability leads to the same incentive effects as 
negligence, strict liability should be preferred. 
 
73 See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 181-82. 
74 Id. at 180. 
75 Id. at 179-80.  
76 In the context of copyright, this is a gross over-simplification because compensatory 
damages are not the only remedy for copyright infringement. Statutory damages and 
disgorgement of profits are generally available to plaintiffs. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)-(c) 
(2012). Because these remedies are expected to be selected when their value exceeds 
compensatory damages, the result is distortion of preventive incentives. As a rule, under 
strict liability, injurers who face supra-compensatory damages, as in copyright, will sub-
optimally over-invest in prevention. See infra text accompanying notes 138-40. 
77 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 359-61. 
78 Id. at 353-58.  
79 See id. at 356, 360; SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 264.  
80 See infra Sections II.C.2, II.C.3. 
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Under a charitable reading, in the few instances where courts and 
commentators tried to justify copyright’s existing strict liability rule in policy 
terms, they had in mind reasoning similar to the one just explained. Such 
courts and commentators argued that infringers are in a better position to 
prevent the accidental infringement and that a strict liability rule would 
incentivize them to do so.81 The argument that copyright infringers are always 
better situated to avoid copyright infringement is a version of the unilateral 
model. In effect, it says that typically it would be only the infringer who can 
take effective measures to avoid the accidental infringement and therefore a 
strict liability rule would produce the same incentives as a negligence one with 
lower administrative and error cost.82 
However, copyright accidents typically do not fit the mold of the unilateral 
model. In many cases copyright owners can take their own preventive 
measures to avoid or at least reduce the risk of accidental infringement. 
Copyright owners could for example utilize the voluntary measures of 
copyright registration, notice and recordation of transfers, in order to make up-
to-date information better accessible to others.83 Similarly, owners can often 
attach other meta-information about the work’s status or their preferences to 
copies of the copyrighted work.84 In cases such as mass digitization projects, 
users of potentially copyrighted works often give owners an easy, well-
publicized, and cheap opportunity for opting out from a particular use of their 
works. Owners can take advantage of this opportunity and remove the 
informational fog shrouding their work and preferences.85 Owners also often 
have available preventive means in cases like the computer code or song lyrics 
copied by derivation from a third party who has illegally incorporated the 
protected work into his own work or misrepresented his rights in regard to the 
 
81 See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963); 
Gener-Villar v. Adcom Grp., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125-26 (D.P.R. 2007); see also 
ALAN LATMAN & WILLIAM S. TAGER, STUDY NO. 25: LIABILITY OF INNOCENT INFRINGERS OF 
COPYRIGHT, in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVISIONS: STUDIES NO. 22-25, at 155-57 (Comm. Print 1960); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 11.4 (3d ed. 1989); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 
13.08[B][1]; Sinclair, supra note 11, at 952. 
82 Of course, one may disagree with the proposition that the infringer is typically better 
situated to prevent the accidental infringement. See Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 12, at 
378-85. 
83 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 205, 401, 408 (2012). 
84 For example, enabling owners to indicate their preferences to users was a major 
impetus behind the Creative Commons licensing framework. Creative Commons offers six 
different licenses, each of which conveys to the user what uses the owner will permit. By 
attaching the relevant “Commons Deed” (a logo that indicates which license covers the 
work), all users receive a clear signal of the owner’s preferences. See About the Licenses, 
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ [https://perma.cc/H8TE-HZ8B]. 
85 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 1840-58. 
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protected work. In such cases owners can often move expeditiously and 
effectively against the third party, thereby removing the hazard created by him 
for accidental infringement by others. In appropriate cases owners can 
effectively “spread the word” about such hazards created by illegal or 
misrepresenting uses of their works. The variations are many and the list could 
be extended, but the principle should be clear: copyright owners often have at 
their disposal effective preventive measures for reducing the risk of accidental 
infringement of their works. 
This is not always true. In some instances, there may truly be no 
preventative measures available to the owner. For example, in a standard case 
in which a musician unconsciously copied a popular copyrighted song in 
writing his own tune, it is hard to imagine what effective preventive measures 
the copyright owner could have taken.86 But it hardly seems controversial to 
assume that the typical case in copyright accidents is one in which the 
copyright owner has some preventive means at her disposal. Furthermore, in 
some instances the user may be better placed than the owner to prevent the 
accident. But note, the critical question distinguishing a unilateral from a 
bilateral model is not: Who is better situated to prevent the accident? It is, 
rather: Can both injurer and victim take meaningful (non-duplicative) 
preventive measures?87 Perhaps it is the case that in most copyright accidents 
as between the user and the owner the former is better situated to prevent the 
accident. But it is certainly the case that in many copyright accidents copyright 
owners could take some meaningful, non-duplicative measures to reduce the 
risk of infringement. 
Under such circumstances the inquiry is no longer which legal rule would 
optimally incentivize potential injurers to take precautions. Nor is it about how 
to optimally incentivize the party who is better situated to prevent the accident. 
The question becomes how to incentivize both potential injurers and victims to 
optimally invest in prevention. In many cases the optimal overall preventive 
strategy would be one that combines precautions taken by both of these parties. 
The search is for a legal rule that would incentivize both injurers and victims to 
undertake available cost-effective precautions. Locating such a rule requires an 
analysis under a bilateral model. 
B. A Bilateral Model 
When effective preventive measures are available to both potential injurers 
and victims, a negligence standard is generally superior to strict liability in 
 
86 See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976). 
87 See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 18 (“[B]oth injurers and victims generally ought to do 
something to avoid risk; the effect of liability rules is therefore different from that in the 
least-cost avoider model.”). 
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creating optimal prevention incentives.88 The reason is that under strict liability 
the victim has little to gain from taking preventive measures. Strict liability 
will cause, for example, a user encountering a work of uncertain legal status to 
invest optimally in trying to obtain the relevant information. But it will not 
cause the copyright owner to invest in readily available, cost-effective 
measures that may further reduce the chance of infringement and facilitate the 
search by the user. The owner has no interest in undertaking such investment 
because strict liability shifts the entire risk to users. The owner will not 
internalize any preventive benefits, no matter how cost-effective. 
This is, of course, a highly stylized analysis. In reality, even under the 
current strict liability standard many copyright owners do use notice and 
registration. They do so for a variety of reasons. First, the Copyright Act89 
creates incentives for using notice and registration by attaching significant 
advantages to such use. The most significant advantages include the denial of 
an innocent infringement defense in mitigation of statutory damages when 
notice is attached,90 a prima facie presumption of validity and ownership when 
the work is registered,91 and the availability of statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees only for registered works.92 Second, copyright owners may 
anticipate that settlement and litigation are unlikely to make them whole for 
the damage of infringement, including the resources they would have to invest 
in detection and dispute resolution. The highly discretionary power of courts to 
award costs and attorneys’ fees,93 together with compensatory damages and 
supra-compensatory remedies such as disgorgement of profits94 and statutory 
damages,95 may lead sophisticated copyright owners to predict that ex post 
enforcement will fail to consistently compensate them for the combined sum of 
damage suffered and enforcement cost. To the extent that this is the case—
which is a proposition that is highly debatable—owners do bear some of the 
cost of accidents even under a strict liability rule and therefore have some 
incentive to invest in their prevention. 
Whatever the reasons for the partial use of precautions by copyright owners 
even under the current strict liability regime, it is far from clear that they are 
sufficient for ensuring optimal prevention measures.96 There is simply no 
 
88 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 341-44; SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 18. 
89 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012). 
90 Id. § 401(d). 
91 Id. § 410(c).  
92 Id. § 412. 
93 Id. § 505. 
94 Id. § 504(b). 
95 Id. § 504(c). 
96 Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 22 (2013) (“[T]he Copyright Office registry is notably             
incomplete . . . .”). Casual empiricism suggests that the current incentives for copyright 
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guarantee that whatever partial incentives exist for using notice and 
registration are strong enough so they are used on an adequate level. The 
plausibility of any belief in the adequacy of alternative sources of incentive for 
optimal precautions by copyright owners drops even more steeply once we 
consider effective means other than the formalities encouraged by the statute.97 
Negligence, by contrast to strict liability, causes both parties to internalize 
the value of their preventive measures. Under negligence the user would take 
cost-effective measures available to him because this is a precondition for 
escaping liability. The owner, however, is still the residual bearer of the risk: 
any harm created when no negligence was present will be borne by him. As a 
result, owners will internalize the value of any additional cost-effective 
preventive measures and therefore will take these measures.98 Consider for 
example the case of the programmer who copies computer code that is 
contaminated with copyrighted code. Under a negligence rule the programmer 
has incentive to invest up to the cost-effectiveness point in exploring the 
source of the code she is using and ascertain that it is not contaminated by 
proprietary code. The owner, however, will still suffer the harm if the 
programmer undertakes such measures (and therefore is not negligent) but the 
preventive measures fail. As a result the owner has incentive to undertake his 
own cost-effective measures for reducing the risk. The owner could, for 
example, search for third parties who disseminate code containing his own, act 
expeditiously against such parties of whom he is aware, and spread warnings to 
potential innocent users. By taking these measures the owner would be 
removing traps that may lead to accidental infringement and reducing the risk 
of the accident. 
The prevention incentives created by a negligence rule will often have a 
synergetic effect. In such cases the effect of the preventive measures taken by 
the owner are not simply cumulatively added to that of the user’s precautions. 
The two sets of precautions may facilitate each other thereby creating a whole 
 
owner precaution are insufficient. In both the U.S. and Europe, a growing body of literature 
advocates for the reintegration of some meaningful formalities to copyright protection. See 
generally STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2011); Sprigman, supra note 
48, at 545-68 (arguing that compliance with formalities is easier today and that therefore the 
costs no longer outweigh the benefits). Part of the reason behind this move is recognition 
that currently copyright owners do not take enough steps to prevent cases of accidental 
infringement. See, e.g., Sprigman, supra note 48, at 495-99. 
97 See Menell & Meurer, supra note 96, at 14-15 (discussing reasons why right owners 
may refrain from investing in providing notice of their rights to others). Note that the 
alternative means of precaution (beyond notice and registration) may be as effective as 
traditional formalities, but are not necessarily as entrenched in professional cultural norms 
and path dependencies of copyright history. See, e.g., Sprigman, supra note 46, at 501 
(explaining that early formalities, such as “registration, notice, and recordation,” helped 
improve information about ownership). 
98 See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 8, 14. 
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greater than the sum of its parts. An owner who attaches notice and other meta-
information to the work reduces the cost of the information search by the user 
and increases its effectiveness in preventing the accident. A user engaged in 
mass digitization who creates a well-publicized, easily accessible opt-out 
option for owners who notify him of their objection creates a new cheap and 
effective prevention measure available to the owner. In this way the reciprocal 
preventive incentives generated by negligence often create coordination 
between owners and users even when these parties have no direct contact. The 
effect of such legally induced coordination is synergetic joint preventive 
strategies. 
In principle, the incentive to take precautions given by negligence to both 
owner and user can be a curse as well as a blessing. In situations in which 
uncoordinated owner and user take measures whose benefit in preventing the 
harm is duplicative of each other, the outcome is a social waste of resources. In 
the context of copyright accidents, however, the scenario of wasteful, 
duplicative precautions, while not impossible, seems atypical. This follows 
from the informational nature of the accident and the relevant precautions. 
Given this nature, a typical precaution undertaken by an owner is aimed toward 
making information available to potential users. The typical precaution 
undertaken by a user usually aims toward uncovering relevant information. As 
a result, owner and user precautions will tend to be synergetic (i.e. increase 
each other’s value) or at least cumulative and only seldom will be duplicative. 
It follows that a negligence rule will produce combined precautionary 
measures from both owners and users that, on balance, are more socially 
optimal than the user-only precautions induced by strict liability.99 The clear 
conclusion of the analysis is that negligence, unlike strict liability, desirably 
incentivizes bilateral care. However, this does not tell us what form of 
negligence rule should apply. So far, we have considered a simple negligence 
rule. But three variants on the negligence rule must be considered: comparative 
negligence, negligence with contributory negligence, and strict liability with 
contributory negligence. We mention comparative negligence only to dismiss 
it summarily. Under a comparative negligence rule the negligence (if any) of 
both the injurer and the victim must be determined and quantified.100 
Responsibility for the harm is then divided between the parties in proportion to 
the relative contribution of their negligence to the accident.101 Comparative 
negligence is broadly applied by courts in traditional accident cases.102 Yet the 
major disadvantage of this rule—its high administrative and error costs—is 
likely to be calamitous in the context of copyright. A comparative negligence 
 
99 See id. at 16. 
100 See, e.g., id. at 15. 
101 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 345. 
102 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 2, § 220, at 772 (finding the “overwhelming majority” of 
states follow a modern comparative negligence system). 
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rule requires two costly and complex negligence findings, one in regard to each 
party, and then a third finding to determine the relative share of the parties’ 
negligence. In the area of copyright each of those determinations, and 
especially the third one, is often very complex.103 This makes decisions under 
this rule costly, prone for error, and ultimately undesirable. 
Negligence with contributory negligence requires two cumulative conditions 
for liability: negligence by the injurer and lack of negligence by the victim.104 
Accordingly this rule also necessitates two distinct negligence inquiries. First it 
must be determined if the injurer was negligent. A positive answer to this 
question is insufficient for liability, but rather necessitates a second inquiry 
about the victim’s negligence. Contributory negligence of the victim would bar 
liability even if the injurer was negligent. By contrast, strict liability with 
contributory negligence means that the injurer is liable for the accident unless 
the victim was negligent.105 Under this rule, only the negligence of the victim 
must be assessed. If, and only if, the victim was negligent by failing to take a 
cost-effective precaution, there would be no liability. 
Both of these alternative liability rules are as effective as simple negligence 
in incentivizing bilateral care.106 Negligence with contributory negligence 
creates optimal incentives for the injurer because he is guaranteed escaping 
liability only if he takes cost-effective measures. The victim too is optimally 
incentivized for two reasons. Under the assumption that the injurer will avoid 
being negligent, the victim expects to bear the cost of the accident and 
therefore will internalize the value of his cost-effective preventive measures. 
The fact that even if the injurer was negligent the cost of the accident will only 
be shifted to the injurer if the victim took optimal precautions gives the latter 
another reason to take such precautions. Under strict liability with contributory 
negligence the victim is incentivized to take optimal precautions in order to 
make sure that the cost of the accident is borne by the injurer and not shifted to 
him. As for the injurer, he is the residual bearer of the harm and therefore he 
will internalize the value of any preventive measure and has incentive to take 
any such cost-effective measure. 
The tentative conclusion is clear. As copyright accidents conform to the 
bilateral model, strict liability is inferior to all versions of the negligence rule 
in regard to the most important dimension of evaluating liability rules. 
Negligence, strict liability with contributory negligence, and negligence with 
contributory negligence all give adequate preventive incentives to both the user 
 
103 Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 353-60 (discussing administrative and error 
costs with negligence rules generally). 
104 See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 14-15. 
105 Id. at 12-13. 
106 See generally id. at 13-16. 
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and the copyright owner.107 As a result these rules will elicit optimal 
preventive behavior from all the parties who are well situated to reduce the risk 
of copyright accidents and often will create the conditions for synergetic joint-
prevention strategies. Strict liability, by contrast, incentivizes only the user to 
take precautions and gives no reason to the owner to efficiently invest in 
prevention. Some copyright owners, for a variety of reasons distinct from the 
applicable liability rules, do undertake some traditional precautions—most 
commonly notice and registration. But there is no reason to believe that they 
have sufficient incentive to do so at an optimal level. Before declaring strict 
liability’s defeat, however, we must compare the four available liability rules 
along other relevant dimensions. 
 
107 There is an important caveat in relation to this general statement. In the standard 
economic analysis of law, while all three rules provide equal incentives for bilateral care, 
they differ on the issue of activity levels and other unobservable precautions. See generally 
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 348 (explaining the concept of activity levels); Steven 
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). Both parties can 
reduce the probability of an accident occurring either by taking more precautionary 
measures, or simply by engaging in the activity less often. For example, motorists can 
reduce the chance of accidents occurring either by driving more carefully (more frequent 
checks of mirrors, for example) or simply by driving less frequently. In theory, there is an 
optimal activity level for each party that should be taken into account in the negligence 
standard. See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 26-28. Typically however the negligence standard 
cannot be reflected to take this into account due to informational burdens it would place on 
the court. See Shavell, supra, at 22 (explaining that the level of activity is not considered 
when formulating standards of care because “courts would run into difficulty”). Therefore, 
the standard economic analysis provides the rule that, of the three negligence rule variations, 
we ought to select one that designates as the residual bearer of harm the party whose activity 
level most affects the probability of the accident. See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 29. Because 
this person bears whatever harm is created, then she has internalized the costs of inefficient 
activity levels. If we select a liability model that designates the person whose activity level 
matters most, then both parties will have the incentive to take optimal care, and at least the 
more important of the two parties will have the incentive to take the right activity level. This 
logic applies not just to activity levels but to any preventive behavior by the parties that a 
court cannot plausibly observe. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 348-49; SHAVELL, 
supra note 5, at 31-32; Shavell, supra, at 7, 22-23. This theoretically applies to copyright 
accidents as well. Ideally we should select the rule that designates the appropriate party as 
the residual bearer of harm. However, doing so in an informed way seems impossible. There 
is no apparent reason to assume that either the user’s or owner’s preventive behavior will 
consistently have a more significant element of activity levels or other unobservable aspects. 
Thus there is no clear answer to who should be the residual bearer of the harm. 
Consequently we leave the issue of activity levels to another day and proceed on the 
informed assumption that it does not affect the analysis.  
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C. Additional Considerations 
Strict liability and negligence rules vary in ways beyond their ability to 
internalize private costs and benefits of conduct. The liability rules differ in 
their capacity to take into account positive externalities, administrative costs, 
and error costs. When we factor these additional concerns into the analysis, the 
conclusion that a negligence rule is preferable is further strengthened. 
1. Third-Party Externalities 
Intellectual works often involve significant externalities. Such works 
typically have effects on others that are not internalized by the person making 
the work or controlling its exploitation.108 In part, effects of intellectual works 
are not internalized because of the inherent constraints of economically 
exploiting and transacting over intellectual works.109 In part, these “spillovers” 
are the result of legal rules specifically designed to avoid full internalization.110 
Externalities are an unavoidable, ever-present feature (and not necessarily a 
bug!) of intellectual works. But in some contexts intellectual works generate 
more positive externalities than others.111 For example, it seems plausible that 
a mass digitization educational project that offers access to many specific items 
on open terms to a broad public for no direct charge produces more positive 
externalities than a computer program whose source code is closely guarded by 
technological, secrecy, and contractual means and which is offered to a small 
number of clients for a customized fee and under restrictive licensing terms. 
Significant positive externalities may be present on either the copyrighted 
work side or the user side.112 An example of the former is a copyrighted 
computer program that is licensed to the public on open terms for no 
commercial fee and with its source code open. An example of the latter is a 
user who is reproducing the copyrighted work as part of a non-commercial, 
 
108 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 
259 (2007).  
109 See id. at 285 (explaining that copyright law includes “a variety of leaks and 
limitations” which promotes “spillovers”); see also Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: 
The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 544-45 
(1998); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining The Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era 
of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 5-6 (1997). 
110 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 108, at 285. 
111 Note that our analysis below is limited to significant positive externalities of 
intellectual works and does not apply to cases of significant negative externalities. We think 
this focus is justified under the assumption that most significant externalities of intellectual 
works that could plausibly be taken into account within copyright law are positive and that 
cases of significant negative externalities of intellectual works will be better dealt with, if at 
all, through external regulation. 
112 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 108, at 262 (giving a broad definition to 
positive externalities). 
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mass digitization project, open to the public. The externalities are relevant for 
our purposes because they may significantly affect the results produced by the 
various liability rules applicable to copyright accidents. To see this, assume 
that under a particular liability rule the user and owner will take into account in 
their calculations only the private value of their actions.113 Further assume that 
due to substantial externalities associated with the copyrighted work or the 
user’s action, the public value of either the use or the harm is different than the 
corresponding private values. The result might be a serious imperfection built 
into a rule that is otherwise assumed to be optimal. The question is whether 
anything can be done about these externalities and whether the alternative 
liability rules are differently equipped to deal with this difficulty. 
Under strict liability the user (who is the only party incentivized to take 
precautions) will fail to take into account positive externalities related to both 
his use and the owner’s work. Ideally, when considering a precaution the user 
should compare its cost to the public harm of the accident. When the 
copyrighted work has substantial positive externalities, the private loss of the 
copyright owner is misaligned with the higher public loss. Assuming full 
compensatory damages as the remedy, the user will only take into account the 
private harm, not its greater public effect. One possible response is that courts 
should correct this distortion by adjusting damages to reflect the public value 
of the work rather than just the private harm to its owner. This is both highly 
unlikely to happen and impractical. Courts that already face grave difficulties 
in calculating damages in cases of intellectual works under a measure of 
private harm can hardly be expected to be even minimally competent in trying 
to quantify in dollar amounts the various public externalities associated with 
such works.114 The result is that in cases of high positive externalities on the 
copyrighted work side users will be insufficiently incentivized to invest in 
prevention. A similar difficulty occurs when it is the user’s activity that entails 
unusually large positive externalities. When the cost of an available precaution 
is larger than the private value of the use but smaller than both the precaution’s 
preventive benefit to the owner and the public value of the use, then the user 
will inefficiently forgo the use.115 
 
113 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 44-45 (explaining that the actor must be forced to 
internalize externalities in order to achieve efficiency). 
114 Cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 14.02 (outlining the difficulties in 
determining actual harms). 
115 For example, assume that ascertaining the legal status of photographs to be included 
in a digitized database costs $10,000, that the expected harm averted by this measure is 
$12,000 and that the project’s private value for the user is $8000. The user’s rational choice 
would be to avoid including the photographs in the database and incurring the opportunity 
cost of $8000. Ordinarily that would be the optimal outcome. If, however, due to significant 
externalities bestowed on others the public opportunity cost of withdrawing the photographs 
is $20,000, the result is suboptimal. 
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Under a negligence rule the court can adjust the standard of care applied to 
the user to reflect externalities on both the copyrighted work and the use side. 
If the user’s activity is of the kind that confers large public externalities the 
court should adjust the value of the user’s opportunity cost accordingly when 
considering a precaution that may result in forgoing the use altogether.116 This 
adjustment of the negligence standard will be reflected in the user’s behavior. 
The user has incentive to conform to the adjusted negligence standard in order 
to shift the expected harm of the accident to the owner. He will not take 
precautions not required by a standard of care that was lowered to reflect 
positive externalities of his use. What of cases when the externalities are on the 
copyrighted work side? Here too a court may adjust the standard of care, this 
time upward in order to reflect the higher harm expected due to the positive 
externalities associated with the copyrighted work. However, without adjusting 
the damages (which we assumed to be impracticable), the adjustment of the 
standard of care will optimally change the user’s behavior only in a subset of 
the cases.117 By contrast, the copyright owner’s behavior cannot be changed to 
 
116 In some cases it may be impossible to achieve through this strategy the first best 
result. This happens when there is a precaution available to the user other than forgoing the 
use whose cost is lower than the marginal harm averted but higher than the user’s private 
value of his activity. Under these circumstances a user will prefer to forgo his activity and 
not take the precaution irrespective of adjusting the negligence standard. As long as, due to 
externalities, the public opportunity cost of the user’s activity is larger than the harm averted 
by forgoing the use, the second best result is for the user’s activity to take place even 
without the precaution. This can be achieved by applying an adjusted negligence standard 
under which in such circumstances the user is required neither to forgo his action nor to take 
the relevant precaution.  
117 A user may not change his behavior despite an optimized standard of care because, in 
the absence of higher damages, the user will not internalize the entire social risk he is 
causing. For example, assume that a user has an available precaution whose cost is 100 that 
can prevent a 10% chance of harm of 800. Further assume that after taking into account 
positive externalities on the side of the copyrighted work, the averted harm is adjusted to 
1200. The adjusted standard of care will require the user to invest the 100 in order to avoid 
the expected harm of 120 (0.1 × 1200). Nevertheless, as long as the damages are not 
adjusted to reflect the externalities the user will not take the precaution. He will not invest 
100 in order to avoid the expected damages of 80 (0.1 × 800). See Ariel Porat, 
Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE. L.J. 82, 136 (2011) (assuming when the standard of 
care is optimal, “injurers will be underdeterred with too-low damages” but will be 
“optimally deterred with efficient and too-high damages”). Nevertheless, a user may change 
his behavior in response to a higher standard of care, even if damages are not adjusted when 
the cost of the precaution is smaller than the entire risk of damages averted by taking it. To 
illustrate, assume in the example above that the cost of the precaution is 10 and that it will 
only reduce by 10% rather than eliminate the risk of the harm. The standard of care will 
require the user to invest 10 in order to reduce the expected harm by 12 (0.1 × 0.1 × 1200). 
The user will invest 10 in order to avoid being negligent and thereby avoid expected 
damages of 80 (0.1 × 800). This is a result of the discontinuity of negligence—the fact that 
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optimally account for externalities under a negligence rule. The owner bears 
the harm whenever the user is not negligent and as a result he has incentive to 
take only precautions that are cost effective relative to the private expected 
harm. 
Strict liability with contributory negligence is the negative image of liability 
in this context. The owner shifts the entire risk of the harm to the user if, and 
only if, he takes optimal precautions under the contributory negligence 
standard. Thus in cases of large externalities associated with the work, courts 
can adjust the contributory negligence standard to reflect the higher value of 
the expected public harm. Owners seeking to shift the risk will conform their 
behavior to this adjusted standard, at least in a significant subset of cases.118 
The user, by contrast, will ignore any externalities of the copyrighted work or 
his use. He will take only precautions that are cost-effective in preventing the 
private expected harm whose risk falls on him. 
Negligence with contributory negligence allows adjusting the user’s 
behavior to better conform with externalities associated with the work and with 
his use, but it does not allow similar adjusting of the preventive behavior of the 
owner. The effect on the user here is the same as under negligence. The court 
can adjust the negligence standard to reflect both externalities of the 
copyrighted work and, when considering the opportunity cost of the use, 
significant externalities of such use. By conforming to the adjusted standard, a 
user shifts the entire risk to the owner and therefore he has a strong incentive to 
change his behavior accordingly. Things are different on the owner’s side. 
Even if the court adjusts the contributory negligence standard the owner only 
has incentive to take precautions that are cost-effective relative to the private 
expected harm. This is so because under this rule the owner is the residual 
bearer of the harm. Under the assumption that the user would avoid being 
negligent, the owner expects to bear the harm whether he is contributorily 
negligent or not. As a result the standard of contributory negligence is 
immaterial to him. The owner will only take into account the private harm he 
expects to bear and will take precautions that are cost justified in preventing it. 
 
as long as a user invests in the precautions required by the standard of care his expected risk 
falls to zero. In many cases this discontinuity of negligence will correct the underdeterrence 
of adjusting the standard of care upward to reflect externalities without a matching 
adjustment of damages. On the discontinuity of negligence, see infra text accompanying 
note 135.      
118 As a mirror image of users’ behavior under negligence, whether owners respond 
optimally to adjustments of the contributory negligence standard depends on two 
countervailing phenomena. Owners may be under-incentivized to take precautions because 
they only internalize the private harm averted by them. Due to the discontinuity of 
negligence, however, the total private harm averted by complying with the standard of care 
will often outweigh the cost of a precaution and as a result owners will take the relevant 
precaution.   
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The net result is that strict liability is worst suited for incorporating the 
effect of positive externalities into the liability rule. It allows adjusting neither 
of the parties’ behavior to be in better sync with externalities associated with 
either the copyrighted work or the user’s activity. Negligence and negligence 
with contributory negligence are equally amenable to adjusting the user’s but 
not the owner’s behavior to be in better (even if not perfect) accord with 
externalities. And strict liability with contributory negligence allows 
adjustment of the owner’s behavior in light of externalities of his work but not 
that of the user. 
At this point a reality check is in order. Do we really mean to argue that 
courts could be competent in exactly quantifying the externalities associated 
with intellectual works and their uses on a case-by-case basis and then fine-
tuning the negligence standard on this basis? Do we really mean to suggest that 
individuals can calibrate their actions to reflect reasonable predictions about 
the micro-management decisions of courts on such elusive matters? No, we do 
not. Given the prohibitive cost of accurately quantifying the many complex 
effects of intellectual works (not to mention the limited institutional capacity of 
courts), any attempt at such case-by-case evaluation is likely to do more harm 
by way of administrative and error cost than good in the form of optimal fine 
tuning of parties’ behavior. But conceding this is not necessarily conceding 
that courts cannot use some rough categorical proxies for cases where very 
substantial externalities are expected and give some weight to these proxies in 
their legal analysis. Arguably, taking externalities into account in this rough 
way is exactly what courts are already doing under the existing fair use 
doctrine. When determining whether a particular use is fair and therefore non-
infringing courts give weight to such factors as whether the use is 
“transformative,”119 whether it is for “nonprofit educational purposes,”120 the 
extent of “the private economic rewards reaped by the secondary user (to the 
exclusion of broader public benefit),”121 and even the outright question of 
whether the use “provides significant public benefits.”122 The most persuasive 
rationale of these inquiries is that the factors identified in them function as 
rough proxies for cases where significant, broadly distributed externalities are 
associated with the use.123 In engaging in those inquiries, courts do not purport 
 
119 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
120 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
121 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994); see also 
Twin Peaks Prods, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1375 (2d Cir. 1993). 
122 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (2016); see also Sega Enters. 
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992); A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 
F. Supp. 2d 473, 482 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
123 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 108, at 288-89. 
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to quantify the exact magnitude of externalities and draw a matching legal 
standard in each case. Rather, they rely on reasonable proxy categories for 
identifying prominent cases of externalities and give some weight to such 
identification in their legal analysis.124 Courts applying a negligence standard 
could follow a similar approach. Indeed they could initially rely on the store of 
proxy categories already developed in the general fair use context. In practice 
this approach would have two implications. First, a somewhat higher standard 
of care would be imposed on either user or owner when a copyrighted work is 
within a category identified as a reasonable proxy for substantial externalities. 
Second, when the user’s activity is within a proxy category indicating 
substantial externalities, the court should more carefully consider the user’s 
opportunity cost when examining a precaution that is likely to endanger the 
use. 
At the end, whether such a softer, proxy-based approach to considering 
externalities as part of the negligence or contributory negligence analysis is 
desirable remains debatable. To the extent that one is persuaded that such an 
approach is desirable, strict liability is clearly the standard most ill-suited for 
its implementation. 
2. Administrative Cost 
Different liability rules are more or less costly for courts to apply. Strict 
liability generates the least administrative cost.125 To decide a dispute under 
this standard a court needs to determine only that the user engaged in a 
proscribed conduct. By contrast, each of the alternative rules involves 
additional inquiries into the negligence of one or both of the parties. A 
negligence analysis—including both setting the standard and assessing a 
party’s conduct under it—demands much information and is costly to 
execute.126 In between the three negligence-based standards, negligence with 
contributory negligence is the most costly. This standard often requires two 
negligence determinations, one applied to the user and the other to the 
owner.127 Negligence and strict liability with contributory negligence require 
only one such determination in regard to either the user or owner. 
Two factors mitigate the higher administrative cost associated with 
negligence. First, over time courts are likely to develop proxy categories and 
rules for identifying negligence.128 These rules, especially within a stare decisis 
 
124 Cf. id. at 289. 
125 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 360. 
126 See id. 
127 When a court determines that the user was not negligent there is no need to determine 
the owner’s contributory negligence. 
128 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 2, § 145 (describing how specific rules often supplant 
the general negligence standard over time); Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and 
the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 325-27 (1992). 
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system, supply guidance to subsequent courts and reduce their decision cost.129 
Over time the accumulation of proxy rules will tend to create a growing well-
trodden zone of increased certainty and decreased decision cost. The result of 
this process is a partial conversion of the open-ended negligence standard into 
a group of less costly to apply specific rules and mitigation of the standard’s 
high administrative cost. 
A negligence standard also generates fewer disputes in need of resolution. 
This may seem counterintuitive. Because a clear-cut rule such as strict liability 
is more predictable than a vague standard such as negligence, it makes it easier 
for parties to settle cases among themselves either with no recourse to 
litigation or at an early stage of it.130 The important point in our case, however, 
is not the formal nature of the legal norm but its substantive content. Strict 
liability always requires shifting the harm from the owner to the user.131 This 
always requires some procedure with an associated cost. Even when parties can 
easily agree on liability, they still need to engage, either through negotiation or 
litigation, in the often complex calculation of damages, and at a minimum they 
must have a transaction for transferring the damages. A negligence standard, 
by contrast, mandates in some cases that the harm remain where it fell. Two 
implications follow. First, the subset of cases where determining liability is 
easy or even trivial under negligence is smaller, but in those cases—as when it 
is clear that the injurer was not negligent or that the victim was contributorily 
negligent—no additional dispute resolution or transaction is necessary. When 
parties agree that there is no liability the procedure ends with no further 
administrative cost associated with calculating or transferring damages. 
Second, even when a court must resolve a non-trivial negligence question, in 
the subset of cases where no liability is found further costly resolutions may be 
spared. In such cases a court can avoid costly and complex determinations such 
as calculation of damages or, when relevant, questions of fair use, substantial-
similarity, and distinguishing ideas from expression. In the subset of cases 
completely resolved by an application of a negligence standard, these 
substantial decision costs are eliminated. This offsets at least some of the 
higher administrative cost of negligence. 
 
129 See Gilles, supra note 128, at 323. 
130 See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 265 (1974) (“[A]n increase in the predictability of the outcome of 
litigation should result in an increase in the settlement rate.”); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 573 n.35 (1992) (noting that “greater 
predictability of outcomes makes litigation less likely”). 
131 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 360. 
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The net result is that strict liability is probably the least costly standard in 
terms of administrative cost. Yet, as shown, the gap from the negligence-based 
standards is not as large as may initially appear.132 
3. Error Cost 
Courts applying legal rules and individuals who plan their behavior under 
them are bound to make errors. These errors will result in suboptimal behavior. 
Because negligence-based standards are more costly to apply than strict 
liability, courts and individuals applying them are more prone to error. As a 
result the error cost associated with the negligence-based rules is higher.133 
Under strict liability a user who always internalizes the value of his 
precautions is left to decide whether they are cost-effective. He may get it 
wrong sometimes, but he will not be swayed by an erroneous legal standard 
applied by courts or by his erroneous prediction of the legal standard. Under 
negligence, however, there is a standard set by the court that decides when the 
harm will be shifted from the owner to the user. Given the complexity of the 
inquiry, courts are likely to err when setting the negligence bar and parties are 
likely to err in their predictions about it. An error in either direction will distort 
the incentives: too high a bar will cause a user to take non-cost-effective 
precautions in order to shift the harm; and too low a bar will cause him to 
avoid cost-effective precautions.134 The reason is the discontinuity in the user’s 
risks created by negligence. Under negligence a user who fails to meet the 
standard of care is liable for the entire damage caused and one who meets it is 
liable for none of it.135 As a result, when the standard of care is too low users 
can eliminate their risk even without taking those cost-effective precautions 
that are not required by the standard. Why would users invest in non-cost-
effective means required by a too high standard of care? Because meeting the 
standard relieves a user not just of the marginal risk averted by the precaution, 
but of the entire risk of his activity.136 Thus, in the presence of error in setting 
the standard of care negligence results in under and overdeterrence. 
 
132 See id. (“In summary, a rule of strict liability results in more claims that are simpler to 
settle, whereas a rule of negligence results in fewer claims that are more complicated to 
settle.”). 
133 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 356-58; SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 79-83 
(describing the uncertainty, error, and misconception that surrounds negligence findings and 
its effect on preventative behavior). 
134 SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 83. The same is true of errors in setting the contributory 
negligence standard applicable to the copyright owner under a rule of strict liability with 
contributory negligence.  
135 See ROBERT D. COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT: IMPROVING 
TORTS, CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 20-25 (2014) (explaining and showing by way of 
example that “a rule of negligence causes discontinuity in liability”). 
136 For example, if required by the standard of care, a user would invest 10 in order to 
reduce by 10% a 10% risk of damage of 800. Meeting the standard of care shifts the entire 
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However, strict liability should not too hastily be proclaimed as superior 
here because such rules are more prone to erroneous damage calculations. In 
copyright cases, often the measure of damages will be different from exact 
compensatory damages. This may happen because of the notorious difficulties 
in calculating the value of intellectual works compounded by the difficulties of 
assessing the harm inflicted on such works.137 Alternatively, the damages may 
diverge from compensatory damages because the law allows the plaintiff to opt 
for different measures such as disgorgement of profits or statutory damages.138 
Under strict liability a user’s preventive behavior is highly sensitive to 
consistently erroneous damage calculations by courts or to erroneous 
predictions about such calculations.139 Under this rule the user always 
internalizes the harm, or, more accurately, he internalizes the value of expected 
damages. Thus, consistently erroneous damages will affect the user’s calculus 
of cost-effective precautions. Too high damages will cause overinvestment and 
too low damages will cause underinvestment.140 
Negligence rules are not nearly as sensitive to erroneous damages 
decisions.141 Here the discontinuity created by negligence is a blessing. With 
an optimal standard of care, too high damages will not create 
overdeterrence.142 When the cost of the precaution is higher than its marginal 
benefit the user is not liable, which means that he shifts the entire risk even 
without taking the precaution and the high damages will have no effect on his 
behavior. What about too low damages? In principle, too low damages may 
cause underdeterrence even with an optimal standard of care.143 Yet in many 
cases the discontinuity of negligence prevents this effect.144 The user shifts the 
entire expected harm to the owner upon satisfaction of the standard of care. 
Thus from his perspective the benefit of a cost-effective precaution is not just 
the measure’s marginal reduction of the harm’s expectancy, but rather, the 
entire harm expectancy. And this will often outweigh the effect of too low 
 
risk away from the user and therefore eliminates for him a risk of 80 (0.1 × 800), but the 
expected damage is only reduced by 8 (0.1 × 0.1 × 800).  
137 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 14.02 (computation of actual damages); 
Jody C. Bishop, The Challenge of Valuing Intellectual Property Assets, 1 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 59 (2003). 
138 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012). One could argue that because of evaluation and 
enforcement difficulties these alternative measures of damages actually serve as proxies for 
compensatory damages, but this does not alter their inaccuracy. 
139 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 354. 
140 Id. at 354, 358. The same is true of strict liability with contributory negligence.  
141 Id. 
142 See Porat, supra note 117, at 136 (explaining that when the standard of care is optimal 
injurers will be optimally deterred with “efficient and too-high damages”). 
143 See id.  
144 Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 354. 
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damages.145 For example, the combination of precautions that would make a 
user non-negligent may cost $1000 and reduce an expected harm of $11,000 by 
10%. In the face of expected erroneous damages of $9000, the benefit of the 
efficient measure to the user is not its supposed marginal reduction of the 
expectancy of damages by $900. It is rather eliminating the expected damages 
of $9000 altogether. As a result the user will take the efficient precaution. Only 
in very extreme cases, where the miscalculation of damages is so gross that the 
entire sum of expected damages is below the cost of a precaution, an 
underinvestment in prevention will follow.146 
It is very difficult to assess which error cost—erroneous damage 
calculations or erroneous legal standards—is more significant. Negligence 
determinations are complex and error-prone in the copyright context. But so 
are damages evaluations.147 Until we have more information on the effects of 
these different types of errors, the consideration of error costs produces no 
clear result or perhaps gives strict liability only a very slim advantage over its 
competitors. 
D. Taking Stock 
We compile the competing costs and benefits of the various alternative 
liability rules into the following matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 Cf. id. 
146 In the example in the text the miscalculated expected damages would have to be 
below $1000. 
147 It would be a tiebreaker if we could say that damages assessments in copyright are 
predictably random in their direction and magnitude. In such a case a user’s expected 
damages would be roughly the same as the expected harm and the distortive effect of 
erroneous damage award will be minimal. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 357. Under 
such circumstances the distortive effect of an erroneous standard of care under negligence 
would be significantly more substantial than the distortive effect of erroneous damages 
awards under strict liability. Id. There is, however, no particular reason to think that courts’ 
damages errors in copyright are predictably random in the sense of being equally distributed 
around accurate compensatory damages.    
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Table 1 
 
When the various dimensions of the foregoing analysis are aggregated, strict 
liability does not fare well. On the most important metric of generating optimal 
incentives to both user and owner in a bilateral situation, strict liability is 
inferior. It only incentivizes precautions by the user, while all the three other 
standards equally motivate both parties to take optimal precautions. To the 
extent one thinks that courts can plausibly take account of externalities via 
rough proxy categories, strict liability is again the least adequate standard. 
Each of the other standards allows some incentive to one of the parties to take 
account of externalities by adjusting the negligence standard applicable to him. 
Strict liability allows for such adjustment in regard to neither user nor owner. 
Strict liability generates the least administrative costs because it requires no 
application of a costly negligence standard. The administrative costs generated 
by the other standards are mitigated to some extent, however, by the 
development of proxy rules and by the smaller number of disputes requiring 
decision. Finally, the consideration of error cost showed no conclusive 
superiority in between negligence and strict liability. While the former creates 
costs attributable to erroneous negligence determinations, the latter creates 
more cost attributable to erroneous damages awards. Negligence clearly 
emerges then as preferable overall to strict liability. It lags somewhat behind 
on administrative costs, but it is superior on the primary consideration of 
optimal prevention incentives as well as in regard to the secondary 
consideration of externalities. 
How does negligence do relative to its two other negligence-based rivals? 
While equal to strict liability with contributory negligence in other respects, 
negligence is superior to it in regard to error cost. Strict liability with 
contributory negligence suffers from two types of error cost. The preventive 
 User 
internalizes 
value of 
precautions 
Owner 
internalizes 
value of 
precautions 
Externalities 
internalized in 
precautions 
Administrative 
cost 
Error cost 
Strict Yes No No Low Moderate 
Negligence Yes Yes User only Moderate Moderate 
Strict + 
Con. Neg. 
Yes Yes Owner only Moderate High 
Negligence 
+ Con. 
Neg. 
Yes Yes User only High High 
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incentives of users, who are strictly liable, are highly sensitive to erroneous 
damages awards and the preventive behavior of the owner is susceptible to 
errors in the negligence standard applicable to him. By contrast, negligence 
suffers only from the cost generated by errors of the negligence standard 
applied to the user. 
Negligence is also superior to negligence with contributory negligence in 
two respects. The latter rule generates more administrative cost because it 
often requires two costly negligence analyses, one per each party. For similar 
reasons, negligence with contributory negligence also generates more error 
cost than negligence. While negligence is only susceptible to the cost of an 
erroneous standard of care applied to the user, negligence with contributory 
negligence suffers from the cost of erroneous standard of care decisions in 
regard to both user and owner. 
One last respect in which negligence is preferable to the other negligence-
based standards is its effects in sequential prevention situations. Our bilateral 
analysis assumed that the actions of the user and the owner are exogenous to 
each other. What, happens, however, when one of these parties is aware of the 
other’s actions when taking his precautions? Under negligence, an owner who 
is aware of a user’s negligence knows that the harm will be shifted to the user 
and therefore he inefficiently has no incentive to take cost-effective 
precautions.148 Under the two other standards the reverse is true. A user who is 
aware of contributory negligence by the owner knows the harm will be borne 
by the owner and therefore inefficiently has no incentive to take cost-effective 
precautions. Which of these symmetrical distortions is more worrisome? A 
plausible argument is that in the copyright context sequential situations in 
which a user is the later in time actor are more common. Typically, the owner 
gets his opportunity to take precautions at an earlier stage as in the case of 
attaching notice, registering the work, or taking action against a third party 
who misrepresents the work’s legal status. The user gets an opportunity to take 
precautions at a later stage, sometimes with knowledge of the owner’s actions 
or lack thereof. This is not always the case, but it is likely the more common 
pattern of sequential situations. As a result, to the extent one thinks that the 
potential distortions associated with sequential situations are significant, 
negligence is preferable because owners typically act first. Compared to its two 
alternatives, negligence is the standard that produces no distortions in the more 
significant subset of sequential cases. 
E. Equitable Cultural Risk Allocation 
Efficiency is the dominant normative framework in copyright. Yet it is 
neither the only normative framework nor necessarily the most attractive one. 
In this Section we shift our lens to three alternative normative theories that 
 
148 On sequential decisionmaking to the choice of liability rule, see LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 69, at 76-77, and SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 15 n.14. 
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bear a family resemblance. They are: self-determination, cultural democracy, 
and human flourishing. Like efficiency, these approaches normatively assess 
legal rules on the basis of a comprehensive consideration of all the 
consequences that follow from such rules.149 Unlike efficiency, these 
approaches do not simply try to maximize a total social sum of one good 
measured by a single scale (e.g., wealth). Instead, each of these approaches 
starts with an account of a political-moral ideal from which follow various 
desiderata.150 These desiderata cannot always be placed on a single scale, in 
the sense that their values cannot simply be quantified by a common measure 
and then straightforwardly traded off against each other, especially not across 
individuals.151 In some instances, a particular desired end may stand in a 
relationship of clear normative ascendance over the others, while in other cases 
a rougher judgment of priorities may be needed.152 One thing, however, that all 
three theories share in common is a concern about equitable risk allocation in 
the cultural sphere.153 Each approach, albeit for its own somewhat distinct 
reasons, places a high premium on ensuring that opportunities for effective 
participation in cultural creation remain broadly open and widely distributed 
among all individuals in society. The accident risk associated with cultural 
creation must be allocated in a way that is conducive to this purpose. The 
upshot of this principle of equitable allocation of cultural risk is a thumb on the 
scale in favor of negligence. Relative to efficiency, the principle provides 
stronger support to a negligence limitation on liability in copyright accident 
cases. It also cuts in favor of setting a standard of care that is friendlier to 
users. 
We elaborate here briefly on the gist of each of the theories, how each gives 
rise to the concern of equitable allocation of risk in the cultural sphere, and the 
implications of this concern for the appropriate liability rule in copyright 
accidents. 
Self-determination focuses on the ideal of genuine free choice, sometimes 
described as being the author of one’s own life.154 Two elements are crucial for 
obtaining this goal. The first is endowing individuals with a meaningful 
 
149 See Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories 
of Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 245-46 (2014). 
150 Id. at 246-47. 
151 Id. at 284-85. 
152 Id. at 262 (giving an example from the self-determination approach).  
153 We are indebted to Talha Syed for insights on the basis of which we develop the 
concept of equitable allocation of cultural risk. The responsibility for the analysis offered 
here is on us alone.   
154 See id. at 251-52 & nn.58-64. For application of self-determination to copyright, see 
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 133-75 (2006), and Yochai Benkler, Siren 
Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 41-57 
(2001). 
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measure of effective agency, meaning the positive ability to define and pursue 
their life paths (as opposed to just “negative” freedom from coercion).155 The 
second is fostering conditions under which such individual choices are free and 
rational. These conditions include a meaningful variety of available choices, 
possession of the capacity and tools for reflectively forming and critically 
revising one’s own conception of the good, and the ability to rationally create a 
life plan for realizing it.156 
A cultural democracy approach involves two extensions of the self-
determination ideal.157 First it recognizes that some decisions that may be 
fundamental for individual lives are “inherently collective” in nature—they are 
made and pursued collectively through the interaction of many individuals.158 
Second, cultural democracy assumes that the realm of such collective decisions 
extends well beyond the formal political sphere into the realm of culture 
broadly defined.159 It conceives culture as the sphere of meaning that defines 
individual identities, ideals, and goals.160 Cultural creation is a dialectical 
process in which socially-constructed individuals take part in shaping the 
“semiotic fog” of culture that in turn shapes their own subjectivity as well as 
that of others.161 Two implications follow from this extension of self-
determination: (a) that the conditions for genuine free choice must be fostered 
in this realm of collective “decisions” through culture; and (b) that this process 
must have a measure of semantic equality that allows all individuals a roughly 
equal opportunity to participate in and influence cultural collective 
decisions.162 
A human flourishing approach starts with a more substantive, affirmative 
account of the good life—of the conditions for living a fulfilling human life 
 
155 See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 18 (1988). 
156 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 377-78 (1986). 
157 For applications of cultural democracy to copyright, see, for example, MADHAVI 
SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 
(2012); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16-18, 34 (2004); Rosemary J. 
Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and 
Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1866 (1991); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and 
Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 295 (1996). 
158 See Bracha & Syed, supra note 149, at 252-53. 
159 Id. at 254. 
160 Id. at 255 (“[The] irreducibly interactive or social processes through which meanings 
are forged, communicated, enacted, interpreted, adapted, challenged, revised, recombined, 
and so forth.”). 
161 See Balkin, supra note 157, at 35; William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of 
User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1458-59 (2010) (describing “semiotic power” as 
“control over the fog of symbols in which we move and with which we define ourselves”). 
162 Bracha & Syed, supra note 149, at 255-56. 
  
2016] COPYRIGHT ACCIDENTS 1065 
 
and realizing the needs or capabilities of human beings.163 It identifies several 
dimensions of a good life and insists that fostering the conditions under which 
all individuals have a meaningful opportunity to enjoy these dimensions in 
their lives is an essential feature of the good society.164 As applied to the 
cultural sphere, it is possible to synthesize three main dimensions of the good 
life shared by most variants of this approach: self-determination, roughly 
incorporating the approach described above; meaningful activity, meaning an 
activity in which one’s human physical or cognitive capacities are highly 
engaged and developed in a manner involving challenge, discipline, and 
intrinsic reward; and sociability, meaning taking part in relations and activities 
whose character and meaning are established communally through interaction 
with others and which involve intrinsic value as well as constitution of one’s 
sense of self.165 
All three approaches share an important feature. They all place normative 
value on certain goods or conditions that are different from, are prioritized 
over, subjective welfare. One way of describing this is saying that a normative 
premium is attached to certain consequences generated by the rules of 
copyright (i.e., those related to the ability of individuals to make free choices 
about their life paths, those related to the level of semantic equality in the 
cultural sphere, and those related to central dimensions of human flourishing). 
Effects of this kind are not placed on a common scale with subjective welfare. 
Nor are they directly traded off against welfare effects.166 In fact, the typical 
relationship between these prioritized goods and welfare is lexical priority. It 
does not follow, however, that evaluation of the effects of copyright on these 
goods is free from any cost/benefit analysis or specifically from copyright’s 
fundamental incentive/access tradeoff. The conflicting effects of copyright, 
including its incentive-benefits and access-costs, usually affect the prioritized 
goods themselves. This means that any normative evaluation still requires a 
tradeoff, but one that now focuses on the effects of copyright rules on a 
normatively prioritized good. This internal calculus may be different than the 
general welfare-maximization one, but it is still a tradeoff.167 
How does all of this relate to copyright accidents? When they are applied to 
the copyright context, one major concern shared by all three theories, each for 
its own reasons, is a principle of equitable allocation of cultural risk. Simply 
stated, the principle is that the risk of copyright infringement should be 
allocated in a way that is conducive to robust opportunities for cultural creation 
 
163 For applications of human flourishing to copyright, see id. at 256-58; Fisher, supra 
note 161, at 1463-72; Fisher, supra note 59, at 1744-66. 
164 See Bracha & Syed, supra note 149, at 256.  
165 Id. at 256-57; Fisher, supra note 59, at 1747-50. 
166 Bracha & Syed, supra note 149, at 261-62, 265-66, 278-81, 284-85 (giving examples 
of this for each approach).  
167 Id. at 247. 
  
1066 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1025 
 
widely dispersed among all members of society. Self-determination has a stake 
in such broad distribution of creative opportunities because being able to live 
creative lives either as professionals or amateurs is likely to be central to the 
fundamental life path choices of some individuals.168 Human flourishing, for 
its part, prioritizes opportunities for meaningful activities. In the cultural 
sphere such meaningful activity usually involves expressive, creative 
enterprises undertaken by individuals either as amateurs or as professionals.169 
Taking part in the myriad of cultural outlets, such as fan fiction, mashups, 
sampling, or independent filmmaking, is where most opportunities for 
meaningful activities (and often for sociability) exist.170 Finally, cultural 
democracy provides a strong support for the most comprehensive and 
systematic ideal of broadly dispersed opportunities for cultural participation. A 
major principle of this outlook is semiotic equality. Seeing cultural production 
as a collective subjectivity-shaping process—one that influences the life of all 
members of society—requires that the self-determination interest of all 
individuals be given equal concern. The concern is not just, as under self-
determination, for an individual’s power to shape his own subjectivity, but for 
his power to take an equal part in the collective process of shaping the 
subjectivity of others. This leads, in turn, to the requirement of roughly equal 
power to all to effectively participate in and influence the cultural meaning-
making process. Note that the gist of this requirement is relative equality.171 
What matters is that all individuals have equal cultural influence relative to 
each other, in contrast to the semiotic division of power dictated by market 
forces or by various background inequalities in society.172 Realizing this 
demanding ideal, at least in part, requires widely dispersing opportunities for 
effective cultural participation and reducing barriers that lead to unequal 
division of semiotic power. 
There are many factors that influence the availability and distribution of 
creative opportunities on both a professional and amateur basis. One important 
factor directly related to the law of copyright accidents is the degree of risk 
associated with cultural creation. As we have seen, expressive creation 
necessarily carries with it the risk of copyright accidents. How this risk is 
allocated will affect both the overall level of opportunities for creative 
 
168 See id. at 285-86, 286 n.186 (discussing the prioritization given by self-determination 
to uses of copyrighted works that are necessary for urgent personal interests); see also 
Yochai Benkler, Networks of Power, Degrees of Freedom, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 721, 749 
(2011) (discussing “the expressive and cultural freedom of fans to make their own meaning 
of (and with) the professionally and commercially produced cultural materials that surround 
them”). 
169 See Bracha & Syed, supra note 149, at 286-87. 
170 See Fisher, supra note 161, at 1418-22, 1430. 
171 Cf. Bracha & Syed, supra note 149, at 255-56. 
172 See id. at 265-66.    
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engagement with culture and how these opportunities are distributed. The 
accident risk associated with a creative undertaking is one of its costs. The 
higher the share of the risk placed on the shoulders of a potential creator, the 
higher is the barrier for his activity. Put simply, one is less likely to create 
when he incurs higher risk of having to bear the loss caused by an accident or 
has to take costly preventive measures. 
Risk also has distributive implications because creators are differently 
situated to manage it. A large, commercial, repeat player is typically better 
situated to manage the risk of copyright accidents associated with its creation 
compared to small creators. Economies of scale applicable to such repeat 
players allow them to better reduce and manage the risk to which they are 
exposed. Compare a large studio producing a multi-million dollar budget 
movie to an independent documentary maker working on a tight budget. 
Clearing of rights, deep inspection of the film for accidental infringement, 
professional legal advice, and error and omissions insurance may all be cost 
effective for the former but beyond the reach of the latter.173 In their important 
study of the effects of the copyright clearance culture on documentary makers, 
Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi quote one filmmaker’s frustrating 
experience with the “hoop jumping” involved: “There are so many lawyers and 
agents and managers, those levels of buffers I would call them, between you 
and the creative people who create these other rights that you need to utilize. 
Sometimes it’s just impossible to get to them.”174 Large repeat players with 
extensive budgets are much better situated to jump through these hoops, from 
getting one’s phone call returned to being able to pay a flat non-negotiable fee. 
Thus in the realm of copyright the risk of accidental infringement laid on the 
shoulders of users is distributed unequally. To increase both the availability of 
creative opportunities and their equal distribution, the principle of equitable 
cultural risk allocation supports significantly limiting the share of copyright 
accidents risk imposed on creators. 
Importantly, the principle of equitable risk allocation provides stronger 
support than efficiency for limiting the risk of copyright accidents imposed on 
creators. Efficiency, as demonstrated by our analysis,175 equally weighs all the 
countervailing welfare effects of a particular allocation of risk through liability 
rules. Under the three normative theories underlying it, equitable risk 
allocation gives priority to the interest of robust and equal opportunities for 
 
173 For example, see the concerns and difficulties of accidental infringement faced by 
independent documentary filmmakers described in AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 6, at 
94-96. 
174 PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES: 
CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY 
FILMMAKERS 11 (2004), http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES 
_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN2E-F83W]. 
175 See supra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C. 
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creation over welfare effects. This means that a legal rule is justified whenever 
compared to alternatives it significantly increases broad creative opportunities, 
even when it results in a net increase in the cost of accidents (i.e. their harm of 
reduced incentives plus investment in prevention means). For example, a risk 
allocation that results in numerous, different sized producers of music is 
preferable to one that results in a creative space controlled by relatively few 
producers of music, even if the latter alternative results in a higher overall 
market value of music produced and a lower cost of preventive measures 
taken. 
This does not mean that the principle of equitable allocation of risk 
universally supports any measure that transfers risk of accidents from users to 
owners. Because the countervailing effects of shifting risk influence the 
prioritized principle of broad and equal opportunities for creation, there is an 
optimal balance of risk allocation internal to that principle. Risk allocation 
internally affects opportunities for creation in two dynamic ways. Backward 
looking, shifting risk to copyright owners is bound to reduce their incentive to 
create and therefore the stock of materials available to users. For example, 
bearing a lower share of the risk of accidents created by their films reduces the 
cost barrier to documentary makers, but it also reduces, to some extent, the 
existing pool of music, images, or clips they can incorporate in their films. 
Forward looking, creators who enjoy the benefits of reduced accident risk are 
also copyright owners in their own creations. In this capacity they suffer the 
negative effect of shifting risk to owners in regard to exploitation of their 
works. The documentary maker who faces a lower cost barrier also bears a 
greater share of the risk of accidental infringement of his own film by others. 
Note that this countervailing cost may apply even to creators who have little 
interest in commercial exploitation of their work. A contributor to a peer-
production-based open code programing project may care little about any 
commercial effects of others accidently using the code she produced. Yet her 
decision to create may be significantly affected by the knowledge that others 
who do so accidently may incorporate her code into proprietary commercial 
code or use it without attribution.176 Because of these two dynamic ways in 
which reallocation of risk to owners negatively affects users, the principle of 
equitable allocation of risk does not lend unmitigated support for any shift of 
accident risk in that direction. It is doubtful, for example, that the principle 
justifies a rule of no liability in any case of accidental copyright infringement. 
Still, the cost/benefit balance internal to the principle of equitable risk 
allocation justifies greater shifting of the risk to owners relative to that justified 
by efficiency.177 
 
176 Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1745, 1790-98 (2012) (arguing that “attribution can serve as an expressive incentive”). 
177 The reason is that small creators are likely to bear a disproportionately small share of 
the overall cost and a disproportionately large share of the benefit of reducing the risk of 
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The principle of equitable risk allocation has two implications for the 
analysis of the appropriate liability rule in accident cases. First, the case for 
negligence compared to strict liability under it is stronger. Compared to strict 
liability, negligence shifts a considerable part of the cost of accidents from 
users to owners. Under strict liability users will invest in cost-effective 
precautions and will bear the ex post cost of accidents not prevented. Under 
negligence users will still invest in cost effective precautions, but they will not 
bear the remaining cost of accidents caused by them despite taking such 
means. For reasons just explained, the principle of equitable allocation of risk 
provides strong support for such reallocation of risk. This support remains 
firm, even if one believes that, contrary to our conclusion above, efficiency’s 
delicate comparison of all costs and benefits of liability rules produces only an 
inconclusive or weak case for negligence. Second, the principle of equitable 
allocation of risk supports some tweaking of the standard of care under a 
negligence rule. As we argued above, courts can hardly be expected to engage 
in fine calculations of dollar amounts attached to potential precautions.178 
Under a negligence standard, courts will engage in rough estimates of the 
overall reasonableness of precautions within their competent sphere of 
knowledge. Because of its stronger support for shifting accident risk from 
users to owners, the principle of equitable risk allocation will cut against 
finding that a user was negligent even when under an efficiency criterion the 
case is close, inconclusive, or even favoring negligence by a thin margin. At a 
minimum, equitable risk allocation will mandate erring on the side of caution, 
against finding a breach of the standard of care, when the case is very close 
under an efficiency analysis. 
 
copyright accidents. A full defense of this assumption is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but a short explanation of why we believe it is well founded is as follows. On the cost side, 
the two negative dynamic effects of reducing the risk of accidents borne by small creators 
are likely to be of a smaller magnitude compared to the overall negative effects of such 
reduction. Consider the negative effect on the incentive to create original works first. Some 
marginal, original works may not be created and their consumptive value may be lost if the 
risk borne by copyright owners is increased. But it is very doubtful that such a marginal 
effect would have any meaningful influence on the scope and diversity of materials 
available for secondary use by small creators. As for the forward-looking incentive effect on 
small creators, many of these creators are likely to be less sensitive to the risk of their own 
works being accidently used. This is true for a variety of reasons including the smaller 
likelihood of accidental use of such materials and the typically more diverse motivations for 
their creation. On the benefit side, small creators who often are less well situated to deal 
with the risk of accidently infringing another’s copyright will be reaping a greater benefit 
from reducing the risk borne by them. 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 125-36.  
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III. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
The previous Part developed two normative justifications for adopting a 
negligence standard in relation to copyright accidents. A negligence rule is 
justified by efficiency reasons primarily because it would incentivize both 
copyright owners and users to invest optimally in precautions against 
accidental infringement. The principle of equitable allocation of cultural risk 
provides even stronger support for a negligence rule. However, the question 
remains, how could such a standard be incorporated into copyright law? 
This Part transitions from theory to practice. Section A examines three 
potential mechanisms for implementing a negligence rule in copyright: (1) 
adding an independent negligence element to the prima facie infringement 
action; (2) modifying the fair use doctrine; and (3) creating a system of rules 
that serve as proxies for negligence. This Section finds that modifying the fair 
use doctrine is the optimal mechanism for implementation. Section B explains 
exactly how fair use could incorporate a negligence test. Finally, Section C 
demonstrates how the negligence infused fair use doctrine would apply to a 
number of real-world cases. 
A. The Implementation Options 
While each of the options for implementing a negligence rule has certain 
merits, this Section finds the optimal way to introduce a negligence rule into 
copyright is by modifying the fair use doctrine. This option is both the most 
realistic and conceptually the most attractive given that fair use already 
embodies a consequentialist balancing analysis. 
1. The Prima Facie Case 
The first option is to include negligence as an element of the prima facie test 
for copyright infringement. Currently, to establish a case of copyright 
infringement, the plaintiff need only prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, 
and (2) infringement of an exclusive entitlement including both copying in fact 
and improper appropriation of protectable elements.179 Incorporating a 
negligence standard into the prima facie case would involve adding a third 
element. In cases of accidental infringement, the owner would be required to 
prove also that the defendant failed to take reasonable care to prevent the 
infringement. The Hand formula, as explained above, would determine 
whether a given precaution is reasonable.180 For example, in the case of the 
documentary filmmaker who accidentally infringed a copyright, whether she 
would be liable depends on whether the marginal cost of available 
 
179 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also 
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d. Cir. 1946). See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
81, § 9.1; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.01.  
180 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
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precautionary measures—such as forgoing the use or attempting to overcome 
the uncertainty—is smaller than the marginal benefit in reducing the expected 
harm. 
The main advantage of this proposal is simplicity. If we are to adopt a 
negligence requirement in copyright, adding it to the prima facie case is the 
cleanest and most obvious way to reach that goal. Adding this element is 
consistent with the usual practice of tort law and would not require the 
modification or alteration of any of the existing elements of the copyright 
infringement action.181 The only change would be that, in a subset of cases 
where the use substantially presents a risk of infringement rather than a 
certainty, the plaintiff would need to prove the extra negligence element. 
However, this option also has serious drawbacks. As a pragmatic matter, it 
is highly unlikely that either courts or Congress will mandate such a change. 
Courts have imposed liability for copyright infringement strictly for a 
century.182 The two-prong test for copyright infringement has been used by 
courts for decades and was sanctioned by the Supreme Court.183 Changing the 
test now would accordingly run counter to a very substantial body of precedent 
and established practice such that courts are likely to resist such a change. It is 
even harder to envision Congress taking action on this matter. Congress has 
shown reluctance in recent years to step in and solve problems in copyright in 
a principled way.184 Moreover, Congress has traditionally treated the definition 
of infringement, its scope, and the test for its occurrence as the domain of 
courts. Other than defining the basic bundle of rights and outlining ad hoc 
defenses and exemptions, Congress has never legislated on the basic contours 
of copyright infringement.185 It can be hardly expected to do so now in a way 
that breaks with long-established practice. 
 
181 Torts based on negligence typically require that the plaintiff prove negligence as part 
of the prima facie case. See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 2, § 124; GOLDBERG & ZIPURKSY, 
supra note 2, at 72. 
182 As noted earlier, early copyright regimes did require fault in some circumstances and 
adopted measures that reduced the chances of accidental infringement. See supra note 13 
and accompanying text. This began to change during the end of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. The Copyright Act of 1909 abandoned categories of infringement that 
required knowing action. See Reese, supra note 13, at 178-79. The Supreme Court 
announced definitively in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. that “[i]ntention to infringe is 
not essential under the Act.” 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931). See generally Reese, supra note 13, 
at 179. 
183 Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 361. 
184 See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 
319-20 (2013) (“Congress primarily has made minor adjustments or technical corrections in 
recent years.”). 
185 The Copyright Act of 1976 says only that one who “violates any of the exclusive 
rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 . . . is an infringer.” 
See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012). This provision tells us nothing about whether liability should 
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This option also presents conceptual problems. The existing fair use doctrine 
already contains some elements similar to those of the negligence analysis.186 
As a result, adopting a negligence standard into the prima facie case would 
require the court to perform two similar inquiries at two different stages of the 
litigation. To establish infringement, the plaintiff would be required to show 
negligence. This would require proving that the marginal cost of precaution 
(including the opportunity cost of forgoing defendant’s action altogether) 
would be less than the averted marginal expected harm to the owner. If 
successful, the burden would then shift to the defendant to prove fair use. 
Under which, the defendant would now be required to show that the harm 
caused to the owner by the use was less than the lost value of the use if it had 
to be licensed.187 Under both tests, the court would be required to assess the 
harm the plaintiff suffers and the value of defendant’s use. The doctrines 
would clearly not be completely duplicative. In particular the negligence 
analysis, unlike fair use, would assess the expected harm as discounted by the 
probability of its occurrence and the cost of preventive measures other than the 
opportunity cost of forgoing the defendant’s use. However, there is sufficient 
conceptual overlap that such a structure would be confusing, partially 
redundant, and cumbersome to apply. 
2. Fair Use 
The second option is to modify the fair use doctrine. Fair use exempts from 
liability otherwise infringing actions that are found to be fair under a four-
factor, case-by-case analysis.188 As already discussed, the negligence and 
 
be imposed strictly or on the basis of fault. Furthermore, the Copyright Act of 1909 had no 
such definition. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 
PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL 
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: THE 1965 REVISION BILL 131 (Comm. Print 1965) 
(explaining that it was “strange, though not very serious” that the 1909 Act lacked “any 
statement or definition of what constitutes an infringement” and proposing the present § 
501(a) as rectification). 
186 See Goold, supra note 22, at 338-56. 
187 On the nature of fair use, see Gordon, supra note 51, at 1601 (“[C]ourts and Congress 
have employed fair use to permit uncompensated transfers that are socially desirable but not 
capable of effectuation through the market.”); Lunney, supra note 72, at 977-78 (fair use is 
invoked unless “the net benefit to society will be greater if a use is prohibited”). 
188 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”); see also Pamela 
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540 (2009) (discussing the 
“fact-intensive, case-by-case nature of fair use analysis”). 
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fairness analyses are both consequentialist balancing tests that share many 
elements. They currently differ in that negligence takes into account expected 
harm as discounted by risk and the cost of precautions beyond simply forgoing 
the use. But the fair use doctrine could be easily altered to fit the negligence 
paradigm. Simple tweaks to the existing doctrine to enable courts to trade the 
expected harm as discounted by probability of harm off against the cost of 
precaution would amount to incorporation of a Hand Formula. Thus, while the 
similarity of the negligence and fairness doctrines is a problem for option one, 
it is a positive boon to option two. We show later exactly how these changes 
could be accomplished.189 
Incorporating negligence into fair use presents a realistic possibility. The 
fair use doctrine is an “equitable rule of reason” with common law origins.190 
Courts not only created the doctrine but, in recent times, have shown 
willingness to adapt its contours to suit various socioeconomic realities and 
normative concerns.191 For example, the transformative use criterion only 
became incorporated into fair use law in 1994 following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.192 Subsequently this has 
become the most important factor in the analysis.193 This was a significant 
change but one that was introduced gradually and with minimal shocks to the 
system.194 Furthermore, Congress expressly enabled courts to mold and tailor 
the fair use doctrine in this way.195 Congress shied away from defining fairness 
in precise terms or providing an exclusive list of factors.196 Instead Congress 
preferred that courts adapt the doctrine to changing conditions. 
One ostensible drawback of incorporating negligence into fair use is the fact 
that the burden of proof would most likely fall on the defendant. In tort actions, 
the plaintiff usually carries the burden of proving the defendant’s 
 
189 See infra Section III.B.  
190 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984). 
191 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.05 (“[F]air use is unique in that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed its contours.”). 
192 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
193 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 
715 (2011) (finding “the transformative use paradigm has come overwhelmingly to 
dominate fair use doctrine” in cases decided after 2005). 
194 See id. at 736-40 (charting the rise of the transformative use doctrine between 1994 
and 2010). 
195 The House Report accompanying the passage of the 1976 Act explains: “there is no 
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute,” and “the courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 
(1976).  
196 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (“Congress resisted attempts to narrow the ambit of this 
traditional enquiry by adopting categories of presumptively fair use, and it urged courts to 
preserve the breadth of their traditionally ample view of the universe of relevant 
evidence.”); H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 32 (1967). 
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negligence.197 But in copyright law, courts have treated fair use as an 
affirmative defense, to be established by the defendant after the prima facie 
case is made out.198 Despite scholarly criticism, courts have held fast to this 
position.199 If a defendant’s negligence becomes part of the fair use inquiry, 
then the burden of proving the lack of negligence will naturally fall on the 
defendant. This may limit the extent to which the shield provided to non-
negligent users in accident cases is effective in practice. Considerations of 
available information show, however, that in this context placing the burden on 
the defendant is not all bad and may even be desirable. In copyright accident 
cases, information about the precautions taken by the user and their cost is 
typically more readily available to the user. For example, a user is likely to 
have much better information on whether she searched the copyright office 
records or whether she tried to determine the legal status of the work and by 
what means. Cases in which an injurer is likely to have significantly superior 
information about his preventive behavior are exactly the ones in which tort 
law applies the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The rule creates a rebuttable 
presumption of negligence and thus places the burden on the injurer who is 
likely to have superior information.200 The conventional understanding of fair 
use as placing the burden on the defendant operates in a similar manner. To the 
extent that one believes that users typically have significantly superior 
information about the question of their negligence, this placing of the burden 
on them may be desirable. 
3. Proxy Rules for Negligence 
A final option is not to adopt an open-ended negligence standard, but create 
a system of rules that would encourage both the owner and user to take care to 
avoid the infringement. Rather than provide for a judicial evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the user’s precautions, Congress could precisely define 
circumstances in which owners and users ought to take care, as well as the type 
of care they ought to take and the negative consequences for failing to do so. 
For example, a rule that denies liability when the user copied from a copy with 
no notice would incentivize owners to attach notice. Such a rule existed in the 
 
197 See supra note 181; see also Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 556, 565 (1973) (“[N]egligence requires the plaintiff to show, prima facie, that 
the defendant owed him a duty of care, [and] that the defendant breached that duty . . . .”). 
198 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (“[F]air use is an affirmative defense . . . .”). But see 
Samuelson, supra note 188, at 2617 (arguing the issue is not yet fully resolved). 
199 See, e.g., Hetcher, Fault Liability Standard, supra note 22, at 450-51; Lydia Pallas 
Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685 (2015); Samuelson, supra 
note 188, at 2617 (“[I]t would be appropriate for the burden of showing unfairness to be on 
the copyright owner.”). 
200 See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 84-100 
(2001). 
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Copyright Act in section 405(b) until the implementation of the Berne 
Convention in 1988.201 The Copyright Act also adopts a similar rule in section 
412, which, subject to certain exceptions, denies statutory damages for 
infringement commenced before the effective date of registration of the 
relevant work.202 A variation of this approach could combine a rule with a 
background negligence standard.203 For example, a general negligence 
standard may be accompanied by a rule mandating liability whenever the work 
was registered. This arrangement provides owners an incentive to register and 
users an incentive to check registration (as does a simple negligence standard), 
but it also makes it much cheaper for courts and parties to reach the right 
decision in cases where registration is the efficient means. In this way, 
copyright accidents are the same as all forms of accidental injury, which can be 
regulated through either rules, standards, or some combination of both.204 
Implementing a negligence principle through proxy rules involves relative 
advantages and drawbacks familiar from the general literature on rules and 
 
201 Section 405(b) previously provided that “[a]ny person who innocently infringes a 
copyright, in reliance upon an authorized copy . . . from which the copyright notice has been 
omitted, incurs no liability for actual or statutory damages . . . .” Copyright Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 405(b), 90 Stat. 2541, 2578 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 405(b) (2012)). The legal result in such cases is immunity from the most relevant forms of 
liability with attendant incentives similar to those created by a negligence standard. The 
provision was however modified only to apply to works distributed prior to 1988 by the 
Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(e)(2), 102 Stat. 2853, 
2858 (1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 405 (2012)). 
202 See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). However, it only imprecisely tracks a negligence 
standard because it does not negate liability but merely reduces damages.  
203 A rule could be combined with a negligence standard in two ways that are sometimes 
referred to as “sure shipwrecks” and “safe harbors.” A sure shipwreck imposes liability 
whenever the specific conditions of the rule apply, leaving the possibility open for liability 
in other cases under a negligence standard. Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1384, 1392 (2016). A safe harbor prevents liability whenever its 
specific conditions apply. Id. at 1391. Sure shipwrecks and safe harbors typically have 
different effects on the regulated behavior. See id. at 1389. We do not further compare here 
effects of sure shipwrecks and safe harbors in our context because copyright accidents 
typically involve a bilateral model. Under such a model a copier’s sure shipwreck is an 
owner’s safe harbor and vice versa. For example, against a background of a negligence 
standard, a rule that imposes liability whenever notice is present is a sure shipwreck for the 
copier and a safe harbor for the owner. A rule that prevents liability whenever notice was 
absent is a safe harbor for the copier and a sure shipwreck for the owner. In such reciprocal 
situations the choice between the competing strategies is harder and often less important. 
204 See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 
YALE L.J. 65 (1983) (discussing the importance of regulatory precision in administrative 
rulemaking); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 130 (comparing how a standard, a rule, or 
something in between affect negligence determinations); Kaplow, supra note 130 (analyzing 
the economics behind rules and standards). 
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standards.205 The advantage of rules is that they are precise and simple to 
apply.206 It is much easier for a court to analyze, for example, the simple 
questions of whether notice was attached or registration made than the 
complex balancing of interests required by a negligence standard. The 
simplicity in application reduces the cost and time of dispute resolution.207 
Furthermore, such rules typically reduce the burden on individual copyright 
owners and users. Their bright-line nature means that individuals can easily 
apply the rules to guide their behavior.208 They also enable individuals to 
assess the outcomes of litigation better than standards, and thus reduce the 
number of cases that go to court.209 
But the downsides to rules are also well documented. In particular, rules are 
less flexible than standards and, as a result, necessarily lead to both over- and 
under-inclusiveness.210 Over-inclusiveness means that the rules sometimes 
capture cases that are not within their underlying rationale.211 For example, a 
rule that imposes liability whenever notice was present would capture many 
accident cases where the copier was not negligent, including cases of plausible 
doubt about the owner’s permission and cases of unknown copying by 
derivation from another work. Under-inclusiveness occurs when a rule fails to 
capture cases that are within its underlying rationale.212 For example, § 412 
fails to exempt copiers who were not negligent despite registration of the work, 
such as in cases involving a prohibitive cost to following an unrecorded chain 
of assignments or cases in which the user offered a well-publicized option to 
the owner to opt-out by objecting to a particular use.213 Moreover the section is 
under-inclusive in its legal outcome. In some cases—specifically when the 
damage expected from an accidental infringement is minimal—exemption 
from statutory damages may suffice to give optimal incentives to the parties. 
But in other cases, non-negligent copiers who are shielded from statutory 
damages are still threatened by significant remedies such as disgorgement of 
profits, injunctions, and even compensatory damages where the actual harm is 
not trivial.214 The result is a distortion of the incentives generated by the rule to 
both copier and owner relative to the negligence optimum. 
 
205 See Kaplow, supra note 130, at 586-96 (analyzing the over- and under-inclusiveness 
of rules and standards); see also Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 130, at 275-77 (comparing 
the effectiveness of rules and standards at deterring behavior). 
206 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 130, at 570, 591. 
207 Id. at 570. 
208 Id. at 569. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 586-95. 
211 See id.  
212 See id. 
213 See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). 
214 Id. §§ 502-505. 
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Such over- and under-inclusiveness could be ameliorated by creating even 
more fine-grained rules, but doing so would be excessively costly in the 
context of copyright accidents.215 The more diverse the context governed by 
the rules, the more expensive it becomes to create such a system (because 
lawmakers must think of all the situations in which the rules will apply and the 
best rules to apply in each case).216 As a result, a standard that can be tailored 
by a court on a case-by-case basis is generally preferable in heterogeneous 
contexts.217 Generally this is the case with accidental personal injury, of which 
Roscoe Pound once said, no two cases “have been alike or ever will be 
alike.”218 The circumstances of copyright accidents may not be as diverse as 
those of personal injury accidents, but they are heterogonous enough to make a 
standard preferable.219 The range of works to which copyright attaches, the 
number of their possible uses, the variety of precautionary mechanisms 
available, and the extent to which the actors can invest in those precautionary 
mechanisms render crafting good rules ex ante a very costly endeavor.220 
 
215 See, e.g., Diver, supra note 204, at 73. 
216 See Kaplow, supra note 130, at 573 (“Even if they are extremely costly to apply, the 
significant likelihood that the particular application will never arise may make standards 
much cheaper.”). 
217 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 130, at 270 (“The problems of overinclusion and 
underinclusion are more serious the greater the heterogeneity (or ambiguity, or uncertainty) 
of the conduct intended to be affected.”); Kaplow, supra note 130, at 581.  
218 ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 142 (1922); Kaplow, 
supra note 130, at 564 (“[T]he law of negligence applies to a wide array of complex 
accident scenarios, many of which are materially different from each other . . . .”). 
219 This explains the high prevalence of standards in copyright on many fundamental 
issues. Authorship is defined by whether a work is “original.” See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Improper appropriation is determined 
usually by the concept of “substantial similarity.” See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., 
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977), superseded by statute on 
other grounds by 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). Whether a use is non-infringing despite the existence 
of prima facie actionable copying depends most commonly on the fair use standard. See 17 
U.S.C. § 107. Furthermore, as the digital age results in copyright governing even more 
heterogeneous conduct, numerous countries are entertaining the possibility of implementing 
more flexible legal standards. See, e.g., IAN HARGREAVES, U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
OFFICE, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 41-52 
(2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 
file/32563/ipreview-finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4J7-K2SS]; P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ 
& MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, INSTITUUT VOOR INFORMATIERECHT, FAIR USE IN EUROPE. IN 
SEARCH OF FLEXIBILITIES (2011), http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/912 
[https://perma.cc/BSQ6-ZM6N]. 
220 But see Thomas B. Nachbar, Rules and Standards in Copyright, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 
583, 586-88 (2014) (discussing how the rules of compulsory licenses, damages-only 
regimes, and additional showings requirements would actually decrease the costs involved 
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Secondary considerations against implementing a negligence principle 
through rules are, again, pragmatic in nature. As mentioned, Congress is 
unlikely to make such legislative revisions to copyright, much less to 
promulgate an entire system of rules of the kind that would be necessary to 
plausibly cover the area of copyright accidents. Further reducing the slim 
chances of congressional intervention is an ostensible conflict with the 
prohibition in Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention on subjecting the 
enjoyment and exercise of copyright to formalities.221 The precautions 
identified by many of the possible rules involve formalities such as notice or 
registration. Unlike formalities backed by the sanction of forfeiture of rights, 
rules that use formalities as proxies for determining liability in accident cases 
are not necessarily in violation of the Berne Convention’s prohibition.222 But 
the question is contentious enough to cause Congress to steer clear of any 
legislative measure of this kind.223 
4. Taking Stock 
Taking all of the aforementioned considerations into account, modifying the 
fair use doctrine emerges as the preferable alternative. This solution is not free 
from difficulties. The case-by-case application of negligence through fair use 
involves considerable administrative cost. The nature of fair use as a vague 
standard subjects individuals to often hard to predict ex post decisions by 
courts, with negative implications on both efficient planning ability and 
liberty.224 And the discretionary and unpredictable character of the doctrine has 
an unfortunate built-in bias in favor of repeat well-financed players.225 Despite 
these significant downsides, using fair use as the vehicle for implementing 
 
in litigating infringement matters); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use 
Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (proposing more bright line rules in fair use law). 
221 Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works art. 5(2), July 24, 
1971, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 (1986). 
222 As Christopher Jon Sprigman explains, “[t]he view that article 5(2) of Berne creates a 
complete ban on formalities is deeply and honestly held,” although in fact there is much  
more room to reinstate formalities than many have appreciated. See Christopher Jon 
Sprigman, Berne’s Vanishing Ban on Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 1566-67 
(2013) (explaining that Berne allows “new-style formalities,” which “work mostly by 
contracting the scope of infringement remedies available to a rightsholder who has failed to 
provide the ownership information required to comply with the formality”).  
223 See, e.g., Jerry Brito & Bridget Dooling, An Orphan Works Affirmative Defense to 
Copyright Infringement Actions, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 75, 91-101 (2005) 
(arguing that “new-style formalities” are incompatible with the Berne Convention); Edmund 
Sanders, Copyright Legislation Unlikely, Both Sides Say, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2003), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/05/business/fi-copy5 [https://perma.cc/EBF2-DFGQ] 
(discussing political hurdles to copyright legislative reform). 
224 See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 148 (2011). 
225 See id. 
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negligence also has important advantages, ones that in our view tilt the balance 
in favor of this option. The case-by-case nature of a modified fair use standard 
allows for flexibility which is more suitable for the heterogeneous environment 
of copyright accidents, compared to rules that are plagued by over- and under-
inclusiveness. Modifying fair use will also avoid the conceptual difficulties of 
the partial overlap between an independent negligence element and the existing 
fair use doctrine. Last but not least, courts incorporating negligence into the 
fair use analysis is a more realistic possibility than the congressional 
intervention required for the two other options. 
In three respects the choice between a modified fair use standard and proxy 
negligence rules is not absolute. First, some rules can supplement and coexist 
with the modified fair use standard.226 For example, a revived equivalent of 
§ 405(b) could provide that under certain circumstances the absence of a 
copyright notice would prevent liability.227 Under this arrangement a subset of 
the cases would enjoy the precision and low application cost benefits of rules, 
while an underlying negligence standard would partly compensate for the 
rules’ over- and under-inclusiveness.228 Second, statutory rules can play a 
facilitative role in constituting preventive measures without directly 
determining the legal implications attached to them.229 Existing arrangements 
such as voluntary notice, registration, or recordation of transfers can decrease 
the cost of preventive measures and solve the associated coordination and 
collective action problems. The availability of these precautions would feed 
into the modified fair use analysis through courts’ evaluation of the use or non-
use by parties of these means in specific cases. Third, courts applying the 
modified fair use doctrine are likely to develop over time precedents and 
standard categories pertaining to the negligence analysis.230 In doing so they 
will partially convert the negligence standard into a system of judicially crafted 
rules, leaving room for further common law growth.231 
 
226 Some have already advocated for fair use to incorporate more supplemental and 
coexisting rules. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 220, at 1503; see also Michael 
W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007) (arguing that fair use law  
can combine “standards with an advisory opinion mechanism that provides ex ante certainty 
in specific cases”). 
227 See Morse, supra note 203, at 1429-30. 
228 See id. at 1420-24, 1429-30. 
229 When the Berne Convention Implementation Act eradicated mandatory formalities, 
Congress expected that a regime of voluntary formalities would continue to play a role in 
encouraging copyright holders to use formalities in order to reduce the chance of copyright 
accidents. See House Report on the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-609, at 45 (1988) (“[T]he legislation includes a new provision designed to 
stimulate voluntary notice by according evidentiary significance to its use.”). 
230 Kaplow, supra note 130, at 577-79. 
231 See Morse, supra note 203, at 1392-94. 
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Having concluded that incorporating negligence into the fair use doctrine is 
the best option for implementing a negligence principle, we turn to explore 
more closely how such a modified fair use doctrine would work in practice. 
B. Modifying Fair Use 
To adequately implement a negligence principle, relatively modest 
modifications ought to be made to the fair use doctrine. In non-accident cases 
(when ex ante infringement is close to being a certainty) no modifications to 
the doctrine are required. Accident cases involving uses that are clearly fair 
even in non-accident circumstances likewise require no modification to the 
analysis. However, when a court determines that the defendant’s action 
substantially involved only a risk of infringement and that the action would not 
be clearly fair if the case had been a non-accident case, the fair use doctrine 
must be modified to take into account elements of risk and optimal 
precautions. In these cases, the court must ask: Did the defendant take 
reasonable precautions to prevent the infringement? If the defendant failed to 
take a reasonable precautionary measure, then the use will be unfair. 
Alternatively, if she did take these precautions, i.e., she was not negligent, then 
the use will be fair. As Congress expects courts to assess the “purpose and 
character” of the defendant’s use, the negligence analysis could formally fit 
under this fair use factor.232 However, for analytic clarity, it is preferable if 
courts conceive of the extra negligence inquiry as a separate and additional 
factor as they are authorized to do.233 
Whether a precaution is reasonable would be decided under the Hand 
Formula.234 A use would be found fair as long as the defendant took all 
precautions whose marginal benefit in reducing the expected harm (PL) 
outweighed their cost (B). Obviously, courts are not expected to calculate exact 
dollar amounts as part of the negligence analysis. As in tort and standard fair 
use cases, the purpose of the analysis is to produce rough assessments of the 
costs and benefits of defendant’s actions relative to reasonable alternatives.235 
 
232 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
233 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The text 
employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ in the preamble paragraph to indicate the 
‘illustrative and not limitative’ function of the examples given . . . .” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1476, at 2 (1976))); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (“The Copyright Act itself lists four non-exclusive factors—I emphasize non-
exclusive—to consider in this inquiry.”). 
234 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
235 SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 19 (stating that when calculating negligence courts do not 
“think in terms of the mathematical goal of minimizing a sum . . . . Rather, they appear to 
gauge the appropriateness of behavior by a rough consideration of risk and the costs of 
reducing it, ordinarily on the basis of felt notions of fairness.”); see also Northland Family 
Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962, 982 (C.D. Cal. 
2012) (observing that fair use is a “sort of rough justice”). 
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The rough assessment of the standard fair use analysis compares the negative 
effect of the use on copyrighted works to the lost value of the use if subjected 
to permission of the copyright owner and possibly suppressed altogether. As 
applied to accident cases, this rough assessment will be modified to take 
account of salient features of the accident paradigm. 
Considering negligence after the initial application of the four statutory 
factors provides some substantial information cost savings. At this stage of the 
analysis, the court has already ascertained the effect of the defendant’s use on 
the market.236 Thus, the L variable in the Hand formula is known. Courts need 
only discount this variable by the ex ante probability and focus on the marginal 
part of the harm that would be avoided by the precaution in order to calculate 
the PL variable. Furthermore, the first factor of the standard fair use analysis 
pertaining to “the purpose and character of the use” provides information on 
the cost of one important precaution available to users, i.e., forgoing the use 
altogether and its opportunity cost.237 Courts typically consider under this 
factor elements such as the transformative nature of the use, the commercial 
nature of the use and whether the use produces broad social benefits.238 These 
elements are the building blocks for assessing the value of the use, including 
broadly spread positive externalities, that would be lost if the use is avoided. 
Where the relevant precaution is not merely forgoing the use, for example 
where care involves search cost, the court will need to perform the necessary 
information gathering to assess the cost of this measure. Once the variables are 
ascertained, the formula must be applied to determine whether a precautionary 
measure was reasonable or not. In cases where there are multiple precautionary 
measures the defendant could take, the negligence analysis must be performed 
separately to determine the reasonableness of each. 
C. Applying the Modified Fair Use Analysis 
This final Section examines some cases where the modified fair use analysis 
may apply and make a difference. Ultimately, whether a particular defendant 
negligently infringed copyright is a case-specific determination dependent on 
empirical questions. We identify, however, some cases where the modified 
doctrine is likely to apply. Each of these cases represents a broader pattern of 
situations that give rise to important copyright policy questions. Each case 
demonstrates how a modified fair use analysis, informed by the copyright 
accidents paradigm, can solve or at least alleviate a significant policy difficulty 
afflicting existing copyright law. The three patterns of copyright accidents 
covered by the examples are: orphan works, copyright triangles, and 
reasonable opt-out options. 
 
236 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
237 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
238 Supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Orphan Works Project 
In May 2011, the University of Michigan created the “Orphan Works 
Project” (“OWP”).239 The term “orphan works” refers to a work that is still in 
copyright, but whose copyright holder cannot be readily identified or 
located.240 Orphan works present a major policy problem because the 
combination of a risk of copyright infringement with a prohibitive cost for 
clearing rights in such works causes them to lie fallow with neither the public 
nor the copyright owner enjoying their value.241 Under the OWP, the university 
tried to digitize such works.242 The project identified out-of-print works and 
tried to locate the copyright owner. To identify the owner, it first performed a 
search for any potential right holders, and then published a list of the suspected 
orphan works online. If no copyright owner came forward, then the work 
would be scanned and made available online in digital format. However, the 
project became the subject of copyright litigation and in 2012 it was suspended 
indefinitely.243 Ultimately, no judicial decision was made on whether the 
project infringed copyright.244 
Commentators have made a forceful argument that uses of orphan works 
such as the OWP constitute fair use, especially when undertaken by nonprofit 
libraries, archives, or educational institutions.245 Arguably, the character of the 
use as involving broad social benefits, the very nature of the work as an 
orphan, and the small likelihood of adverse market impact when the work is 
not being commercially exploited makes a strong case for fair use.246 
 
239 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2014). 
240 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 1 (2006), 
http://copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL9Z-8MKU]. 
241 See generally Christina M. Costanzo, Have Orphan Works Found a Home in Class 
Action Settlements?, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 569 (2011); David R. Hansen et al., Solving the 
Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2013); Matthew 
Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1503 (2012); 
Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379 (2012); Robert Kirk Walker, Negotiating the Unknown: A 
Compulsory Licensing Solution to the Orphan Works Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 983 
(2014). 
242 Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 92. 
243 Joseph Lichterman, ‘U’ Halts Orphan Works Project in Light of Lawsuit, MICH. 
DAILY (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.michigandaily.com/news/u-halts-orphaned-work-
project [https://perma.cc/8TBP-D3J5]. 
244 Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 105 (holding the infringement claims were not ripe). 
245 Hansen et al., supra note 241, at 23-24 (“[T]here is a strong argument that making 
orphan works available to the public for purposes such as teaching, scholarship and research 
would be fair use, especially when done by nonprofit libraries, archives and the like.”); 
Urban, supra note 241. 
246 Hansen, supra note 241, at 24-25; Urban, supra note 241. 
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But the argument is not airtight. It is open to debate whether the works are 
transformative under the first fair use factor. Here, the university reproduced 
and displayed protected material verbatim and therefore the use does not seem 
to transform the content of the expression. The growing body of case law that 
recognizes the transformative nature of uses that copy entire works verbatim 
for innovative purposes such as digital searches and analysis247could perhaps 
be distinguished here. One may argue that the use is not transformative in 
purpose because the purpose behind the original distribution of the books (i.e., 
to entertain and inform through access to the books’ content) and behind the 
OWP are ostensibly the same.248 Many of the works were fictional and within 
the core of copyright under the second fair use factor.249 Under the third factor 
the university is reproducing and displaying entire works verbatim.250 And 
finally, one may say that although the works are out of print now, the use of 
the works in the OWP will affect the copyright holders’ ability to put the 
works back on the market in the future.251 Our point is not that the OWP or 
similar projects are necessarily not fair use, but rather that under the 
conventional doctrine the fair use case is far from completely secure. 
Understanding the OWP under the accident paradigm substantially 
strengthens its fair use prospects. Given the status of the works as orphan, there 
is only a probability that a particular work is under copyright, that there exists 
an owner with viable interest in the work, and that such an owner objects to the 
use. The expected harm of the use, which is probably small to begin with,252 
has to be discounted to account for this. As the expected harm is small, the 
 
247 See, e.g., Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 101 (finding full-text searching of works to be 
fair); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
display of thumbnail images of copyright owner’s photographs was fair use); Authors Guild, 
Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding as fair the digital 
reproduction of millions of copyrighted books and display of “snippets to the public”), aff’d, 
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (2016).  
248 See Michael D. Murray, What Is Transformative? An Explanatory Synthesis of the 
Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use Law, 11 
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 260, 261 (2012) (arguing that “a change in the predominant 
purpose of the work” is necessary to pass the “transformative test”). 
249 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (“In general, fair use is more likely 
to be found in factual works than in fictional works.”); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (“This factor calls for recognition that some works 
are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others . . . .”). More creative 
works are favored under this factor. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 
522, 531 (9th Cir. 2008). 
250 See Cambridge Univ. Press. v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1227-35 (N.D. Ga. 
2012), rev’d sub nom. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). 
251 This would cut against finding fair use under the fourth factor. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2012). 
252 See, e.g., Urban, supra note 241, at 1407. 
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potential precautionary measure of forgoing the use appears to fail the Hand 
formula. The opportunity cost associated with forgoing this socially valuable 
project would seem to outweigh any small expected harm to the copyright 
owners.253 What about other available precautions? To the extent that the cost 
of such precautions is modest, they may be justified even by the small 
marginal harm they will be avoiding in this context. The university, however, 
took exactly such precautions in the form of publishing a list of the works it 
intended to use and a basic search for their owners.254 As a result it was likely 
not negligent, and the use should be found fair. 
On a broader level, applying the accident framework to the OWP case 
brings into sharper focus the arguments made by commentators who promote 
fair use as a solution for the orphan works problem. The modified fair use 
analysis based on a negligence principle reinforces the argument already made 
that fair use is a partial solution for the troubling problem of orphan works.255 
But, even more fundamentally, introducing this issue into the accident 
paradigm allows us to see clearly why many unauthorized uses of such works 
should be allowed and under what conditions. Understood within the accident 
framework, taking such precautions is not a secondary step that users of orphan 
works can take to demonstrate good faith and increase the chances of their fair 
use defense as some commentators suggest.256 Rather, taking precautions is the 
heart of the negligence analysis and a normatively attractive way to determine 
who ought to bear the burden of unintended harm in such cases. 
The orphan works example also demonstrates how a modified fair use 
doctrine generates optimal preventive incentives to both owners and users. 
Under this rule, users like the University of Michigan have an incentive to take 
cost effective precautions such as search and notification. This is true under 
strict liability as well.257 The difference is that under the negligence standard 
embodied in the modified fair use analysis owners too would have incentives 
to take precautions. Copyright owners who retain interest in their ostensibly 
 
253 See id. at 1388. 
254 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2014). 
255 See, e.g., Urban, supra note 241 (arguing that fair use is a “partial solution” to the 
orphan works problem); see also supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
256 See, e.g., Urban, supra note 241, at 1425-27 (discussing “seven ways libraries and 
archives could strengthen the fair use arguments for digitizing orphans and making them 
available to patrons”). 
257 The University of Michigan stated that they suspended the project after scrutiny 
“revealed a number of errors” and that once these are fixed, the project will be resumed. See 
Jason Bogg, University of Michigan Library Delays Sharing of Orphan Works, ADWEEK 
(Sept. 11, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.adweek.com/galleycat/university-of-michigan-
library-delays-sharing-of-orphan-works/39397 [https://perma.cc/D9Z6-6WMF]. However, 
the project has not yet resumed, and it is an open question as to why. The most likely answer 
is the threat of supra-competitive statutory damages distorts their incentives that would be 
efficient under a strict liability rule plus compensatory damages.  
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orphan works would not be able to sit idle, simply relying on the threat of strict 
liability for statutory damages to deter potential users. Instead, such owners 
would have incentive to invest in cost-effective means for preventing 
accidental infringement of their works, including recordation of transfers, 
responding to public announcements by users, or even revival of the work’s 
exploitation. 
2. De Acosta v. Brown and Copyright Triangles 
De Acosta v. Brown258 is one of the most prominent cases establishing the 
strict liability nature of copyright infringement.259 De Acosta wrote a screen 
play based on the life of Clara Barton, the founder of the American Red Cross. 
In the screenplay, she created a fictitious romance between Barton and another 
character. In 1941, Beth Brown wrote a biography of Barton in which she 
copied parts of De Acosta’s screenplay. Brown then contracted with Hearst 
Magazines to publish extracts from the forthcoming book. De Acosta 
successfully sued both Brown and Hearst Magazines for infringement.260 
Hearst was found to have infringed innocently; it had neither knowledge of 
Brown’s copying nor any reason to know. Yet, under copyright’s strict liability 
rule, Hearst was just as liable as Brown.261  
On this point, Judge Hand dissented.262 Accepting copyright’s strict liability 
in general, he argued that a different rule should apply when a person 
unwittingly copies from an intermediary source with no awareness that the 
source contains copied expression.263 Particularly, he expressed concern that 
requiring publishers to internalize the owner’s harm would be “an appreciable 
incubus upon the freedom of the press” and a “not negligible depressant upon 
the dissemination of knowledge.”264 He concluded that Hearst should not be 
liable in the absence of some reason to believe the underlying work was 
copied.265 
 
258 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945). 
259 See id.; see also Sinclair, supra note 11, at 948-49 (“The rule of strict liability was 
firmly implanted by the De Acosta case and its progenitors . . . .”). 
260 De Acosta, 146 F.2d at 409-10. 
261 See id. at 410-11. 
262 Id. at 412. 
263 Id. at 413 (“I can see no reason why the ordinary rule of liability for torts should not 
apply to copying a copy; and I see very strong reasons why it should . . . .”). Judge Hand 
had also suggested this should be the proper rule in a previous case. See Barry v. Hughes, 
103 F.2d 427, 427 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[O]ne who copies from a plagiarist is himself necessarily 
a plagiarist, however innocent he may be . . . , but that would be a harsh result, and contrary 
to the general doctrine of torts.” (citation omitted)). 
264 De Acosta, 146 F.2d at 413. 
265 Id. at 414. Judge Hand analogized this situation to a case in which one carries away 
his own bag with no reason to know the bag contains another person’s watch. While 
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The facts of De Acosta are illustrative of a common kind of accidental 
infringement in which a defendant copies the owner’s work by deriving it from 
a third party.266 As in De Acosta, the defendant may not be aware of copying 
the original at all. Alternatively, the defendant may be aware of copying the 
original but erroneously believe a third party’s representation as to the legal 
status of the work or as to his rights to authorize the relevant use. Such cases 
form the classic problem of a legal triangle.267 In such a triangle the liability of 
the party directly at fault, who caused the legal accident, is not part of the 
direct substantive legal question between the plaintiff and the defendant.268 The 
law has to decide on whom the harm will fall as between two innocents. In the 
copyright version of this triangle, those two innocents are the owner and the 
defendant who unwittingly copied by derivation from the third party. De 
Acosta is a private case of a copyright triangle consisting of a publisher, an 
author and a copyright owner. While the author is the party at fault, the owner 
and the publishers are both innocents. 
While existing copyright law ignores such legal triangles, a modified fair 
use doctrine would take them into account and lead to substantially different 
results. The issue of fair use was not considered in De Acosta, but it most 
likely would not have saved Hearst.269 The outcome would be different, 
however, under our proposed modified fair use. The harm caused to Brown, 
once discounted by the ex ante probability, is small and accordingly there were 
few, if any, reasonable precautions available to Hearst. The magazine could 
have required assurances from Brown that her work did not contain infringing 
 
conversion is a strict liability tort, he explained, it does not cover cases where the defendant 
is not aware of the very physical act that gives rise to it. Id. at 413. 
266 For other examples in this pattern, see Walco Products, Inc. v. Kittay & Blitz, Inc., 
354 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) and Leigh v. Barnhart, 96 F. Supp. 194, 194-95 
(D.N.J. 1951) (finding defendant reproduced artwork found in a magazine with consent of 
magazine publisher but without authorization of artwork owner and without notice of the 
latter’s copyright). 
267 Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law,” 90 MICH. L. REV. 95 
(1991). 
268 Although, of course, as in De Acosta, he may be a joint defendant and be found 
jointly liable for the harm. 146 F.2d at 408. 
269 The copying was commercial in nature and of questionable transformativeness. The 
copying covered substantially important parts of the copyrighted text, including the 
fictitious love interest. Id. at 410. The underlying work was unpublished, id. at 409, and the 
Supreme Court has noted how fair use is narrower in relation to unpublished works, see 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985). It is unclear 
how Hearst’s use affected the market but there is the possibility that it deprived the owner of 
reasonable license fees. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d 
Cir. 1994). Once again, it is wholly plausible that fair use would apply in these 
circumstances, but it is far from certain. 
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material.270 However, the ease of Brown providing false assurances makes this 
precaution likely only to avert a very small marginal part of the harm. The cost 
of the assurances—especially ones exacting enough to reduce the chance of 
falsehoods—would seem, therefore, not justified under the Hand formula. 
Alternatively, Hearst could have performed an independent search. But 
because the work was unpublished and not registered with the copyright 
office,271 any search would likely impose substantial cost in order to reveal 
very little information, thus averting only a small margin of expected harm.272 
Therefore, under the modified fair use doctrine, Hearst would probably not be 
liable as there were likely no reasonable precautionary measures available to it. 
The broader insight arising from this example is how a modified fair use 
doctrine could help deal with the difficult question of copyright legal triangles 
in general, and in the specific context of a publisher/author/owner relationship 
in particular. Copyright’s existing strict liability simply places the harm on the 
innocent user, thereby giving no precautionary incentive to the innocent owner. 
By contrast, a negligence standard provides a coherent guide on how to 
allocate the unintended harm between the two equally innocent parties in the 
triangle, thereby incentivizing both to take optimal precautions. The 
publisher/author/owner triangle is an instance of this pattern. Requiring the 
publisher to internalize the entirety of the owner’s harm is, as Judge Hand 
intimated, a costly depressant on the publisher’s otherwise socially beneficial 
activities. By requiring the publisher only to take reasonable precautions, we 
incentivize both owners and publishers to take cost-justified measures to 
reduce the overall social cost of the accident without placing an undue burden 
on the “freedom of the press.” 
3. Field v. Google Inc. and Opt-Out 
In Field v. Google Inc.,273 a district court held that the reproduction and 
distribution of copyrighted works through Google’s cache did not infringe 
copyright.274 A cache copy is a copy of the HTML code of a website produced 
by Google and stored on its systems as part of the indexing process necessary 
 
270 Hearst apparently did receive some assurances. See De Acosta, 146 F.2d at 412 
(“Brown the infringer assured the Cosmopolitan editor of the research that she had done on 
the matter . . . .”). 
271 Id. at 409. 
272 The work was registered at the office of the Screen Writers Guild in Hollywood. Id. at 
409. However, without knowing more about the underlying work, Hearst would have no 
obvious reason to search this record. Searching this record would likely only occur if the 
company adopted a broad policy of searching it (and presumably other similar records) 
every time it wished to print expressive material. This would again be prohibitively 
expensive in relation to the marginal cost savings. 
273  412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
274 Id. at 1109.  
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for its search engine.275 Google offers users access to these cached webpages. 
Field “decided to manufacture a claim for copyright infringement against 
Google in the hopes of making money from Google’s standard practice.”276 
Field was aware of Google’s caching practice and that he could easily opt-out 
from it by placing in his website’s code a “no-archive” meta-tag. This meta-tag 
was recognized by Google and widely known in the industry as signaling a 
preference not to be cached. Field placed his works on his website and set the 
permissions in a standard file called “robots.txt” to signal that he wanted his 
website to be crawled and indexed by search engines.277 
Once, as predicted, his website was cached, he sued for $2,550,000 in 
statutory damages despite Google’s disabling of the cache access to his 
webpage as soon as it learned of his claim.278 These circumstances did not 
make Field a sympathy-inducing plaintiff. They also gave the court plenty of 
legal grounds for rejecting the claim, including implied license,279 estoppel280 
and fair use.281 
The significance of the case thus lies not in its specific facts, but in the 
general pattern of defendant’s use of the copyrighted work and in the court’s 
application of fair use to this pattern. The general pattern represented by Field 
is accidental infringement accompanied by the reasonable precaution of 
making an opt-out option available.282 Because many website owners were 
happy to have their copyrighted content cached,283 Google was only aware of a 
probability of infringing the copyright of some owners opposed to such use of 
their works.284 To avert the risk of such accidental infringement, Google took 
the most efficient precaution available. Instead of employing the impracticable 
and costly means of affirmatively obtaining permission from the millions of 
owners of all cached websites, it allowed owners to signal their objection. This 
was done through the cheap, standardized, and well-known technological 
 
275 Id. at 1111. 
276 Id. at 1113. 
277 Id. at 1114. 
278 Id. at 1110, 1114. 
279 Id. at 1115-16 (finding for Google on this defense). 
280 Id. at 1116-17 (same). 
281 Id. at 1117-23 (same). 
282 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 1801-02, 1817-49. 
283 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (“[T]he owners of literally billions of Web pages 
choose to permit such links to be displayed.” (emphasis added)). 
284 See generally Miquel Peguera, When the Cached Link Is the Weakest Link: Search 
Engine Caches Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
589, 594-609 (2009); David M. Ray, Note, The Copyright Implications of Web Archiving 
and Caching, 14 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1 (2006), http://jost.syr.edu/wp-
content/uploads/the-copyright-implications-of-web-archiving-and-caching.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9MQZ-UFE7]. 
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means of adding a “no archiving” meta-tag. Thus, when Field is viewed as an 
accident case, it is easy to conclude that Google was not negligent. 
Other cases within this general pattern pose more complex issues than Field. 
Mass digitization projects are a case in point.285 One example of such a project 
is the Library of Congress’s American Memory project, designed to preserve 
and make accessible a wealth of historical materials.286 Another is Google 
Books, which involves the digital reproduction of millions of printed texts in 
order to render them searchable on the Internet without displaying substantial 
portions of the text to users.287 Two features of such projects are particularly 
salient for their analysis as copyright accidents. The first is the substantial, 
often prohibitive cost associated with trying to ascertain the legal status of the 
works reproduced.288 This feature overlaps with the problem of orphan works 
discussed above.289 The second feature is the fact that, like in Field, in many 
contexts the user can plausibly assume that a substantial number of copyright 
owners would not object to the use and that ascertaining the preferences of 
specific owners may be costly.290 In such circumstances, often the most 
appropriate means of avoiding the copyright accident is creating an efficient 
opt-out option that allows owners to easily step forward and announce their 
objection.291 Field is an obvious case of this kind. But the same is arguably 
true in more tricky cases of mass digitization. As the district court found the 
Google Books mass digitization to be fair per se, the opt-out options provided 
by Google played no explicit role in the fair use analysis.292 However, there is 
no guarantee that other courts would similarly find such use to be fair use per 
se, especially if the defendant engages in more intensive use of the work than 
Google, such as substantial display or dissemination.293 In such cases, the 
accident features must be taken into account through the modified fair use 
analysis. When this is accomplished, whether the defendant provided an opt-
out option may be the dividing line between infringement and fair use. 
Finally, and most interestingly, the reasoning in Field is a conspicuous 
example of a court using in an accident case reasoning very close to the 
 
285 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 1803. 
286 See generally About American Memory: Mission and History, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/G8MM-LXJM]. 
287 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (2016). 
288 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 1803. 
289 See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
290 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 1803. 
291 See id. 
292 Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
293 See Peguera, supra note 284, at 628 (“Field v. Google might not provide reliable 
guidance for future claims on the issue of the underlying liability of a search engine’s 
cache.”). 
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modified fair use analysis we propose. The court’s opinion found Google’s use 
to be highly transformative, a finding that strongly militates in favor of fair 
use.294 One of the reasons it gave for this finding was the easy and accessible 
opt-out option supplied by Google that, according to the court gave the 
ultimate decision of “whether ‘Cached’ links will appear” to the owners.295 
Even more striking is the fact that the court added an additional factor to the 
traditional four-factor analysis. Nominally this fifth factor considered the 
user’s good faith.296 The essence of the good faith the court imputed to Google, 
however, was making available to copyright owners an easy and accessible 
means for opting out, and honoring the owners’ wishes once they were 
signaled through this means.297 The simple translation of this reasoning is that 
the fact that Google employed a cost effective precaution to prevent what was 
clearly a copyright accident cut heavily in favor of fair use. 
The reasoning in Field shows that in accident cases where an opt-out option 
was provided, at least one court has employed a rough variant of the modified 
fair use doctrine we propose. Indeed, one may suspect that in Author’s Guild 
the fact that Google offered an easy opt-out option from the Google Books 
project played some role in helping the court reach its fair use conclusion, 
although there is no trace of that in the opinion itself.298 Thus some courts 
already implement a half-articulated version of the modified fair use doctrine 
appropriate for copyright accidents. They would do well to shift to a conscious, 
better articulated, and more coherent application of this modified doctrine to 
deal with copyright accidents. 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright accidents are ubiquitous and significant. Copyright needs a 
doctrinal and conceptual mechanism to address them. But currently it has none. 
A myriad of legitimate and beneficial activities create a risk of copyright 
infringement. Users frequently encounter situations where uncertainty 
regarding the work’s legal status, ownership, and restrictions increases 
 
294 Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118-19, 1123 (D. Nev. 2006). 
295 Id. at 1119, 1122-23.  
296 Id. at 1122-23. 
297 Id. at 1122 (finding that “Google does not provide ‘Cached’ links to any page if the 
owner of that page does not want them to appear”). 
298 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (2016). Some argue that opt-out should 
have mattered in this case and similar fair use litigation. See Bracha, supra note 47, at 1855-
61; Nari Na, Note, Testing the Boundaries of Copyright Protection: The Google Books 
Library Project and the Fair Use Doctrine, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 439 (2007); 
see also Jonathan Band, The Google Library Project: The Copyright Debate, CYBERSPACE 
LAW., March 2006, at 1 (finding “the cost of owners opting out is much less” than the cost 
for Google to seek permission). 
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transaction costs to the point that voluntary market bargaining for eliminating 
or allocating this risk is impossible. In such cases, copyright simply falls back 
on its entrenched principle of strict liability and places the entire risk on the 
shoulders of the user. Unfortunately this rule is neither efficient nor in line 
with the principle of equitable distribution of cultural risk. A negligence rule is 
superior in creating incentives to optimally invest in preventing copyright 
accidents not just to the user, but to both user and copyright owner. Negligence 
also reduces the risk associated with creation, thereby distributing 
opportunities for cultural participation more broadly and evenly. Given these 
desirable consequences, this Article proposes that, in cases of copyright 
accidents, copyright law adopt a negligence rule. Such a rule could be 
implemented through simple modifications to the fair use doctrine. More 
generally, the framework of copyright accidents sheds new light on many 
troubling copyright problems such as orphan works, opt-out options, and 
copyright triangles. In all of these contexts as well as others still waiting to be 
explored, copyright, like the common law more broadly, should only hold 
individuals liable for accidents when they failed to act with reasonable care for 
others.  
Long ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., observed that when an 
“action cannot be avoided, and tends to the public good, there is obviously no 
policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon 
the actor.”299 Surprisingly perhaps, in the context of modern, ever-present 
copyright, these words ring truer than ever. 
 
 
299 HOLMES, supra note 9, at 95. 
